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Admissions in SEC Enforcement Cases:
The Revolution That Wasn't
David Rosenfeld *
ABSTRACT: In 2013, the SEC departed from its long-standing policy of
settling enforcement matters on a no-admit/no-deny basis, and for the first
time began to require admissions when settling certain cases. The new
admissionspolicy was greeted with considerableconcern by many who thought
it would lead to fewer settlements, more litigation, and a decline in the
effectiveness ofSEC enforcement. After more thanfouryears, afull assessment
of the policy is in order. The SEC continues to report record enforcement
numbers and has touted the admissionspolicy as a great success. However,
this Article empirically demonstratesthat the SEC has obtained admissionsin
a very small number of cases since adoptingthe new policy, and on only afew
occasions in cases involving the most serious charges, namely scienter-based
fraud. Moreover, it shows that the SEC has applied the new policy
inconsistently and haphazardly, treating like cases differently-a problem
that is compounded by a complete lack of transparency in the process. This
Article contends that these trends reveal a deliberate strategy of
accommodation on the part of the SEC, through which the agency has
trumpeted a message of tough enforcement and public accountability, while
in reality continuing business as usual. In light of these issues, this Article
concludes that the admissions policy should be reconsidered or abandoned
altogether.
1.

INTRO DU CTION .............................................................................

II.

THE GENESIS OF THE ADMISSIONS POLICY ....................................

*

1 14

A.

B.

118
N O-ADMIT/NO-DENY .............................................................. 118
120
CRITICISM OFNO-ADMIT/NO-DENY .........................................

C.

THE NEWADMISSIONS POLICY .................................................

121

1. Convictions, Pleas, and Admissions in Parallel
121
A ctio n s ....................................................
122
2. Admissions in SEC Settlements ....................................

Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. I would like to thank

Megan Yentes and Ryan Lowe for their excellent research assistance.

IOWA LAWREVIEW

114

III.

[Vol. 103:113

D.

CRITCISM AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE ADMISSIONS

E.

POLICY .................................................................
124
THEJUDICAL AFTERMATH .................................................
126

A N ALYSIS ...................................................................
127

A.

B.

SECENFORCEMENTBY THENUMBRS ....................................
127
HE ADMISSIONS CASES ....................................................
129

The Admissions Cases by the Numbers .......................
129
T he Charges .............................................
138
i. Fraud ...............................................
13 8
a. E n tities ...........................................
140
b. Individuals ........................................
144
ii. Non-Fraud Charges ......................................
146
3. Classification of Cases ......................................
147
4. Form of the Admissions .....................................
148
1.

2.

IV.

ASSESSMENT AND CRITIQUE ..............................................
149

A.

B.
C.

ABSENCE OF THE MOST SERIOUS CHARGES ..............................
150
LACK OF CLEAR STANDARDS ...........................................
155
LACK OF CONSISTENCY ...............................................
157
1. Lack of Consistency Between Similar Cases ................
157

Lack of Consistency Between Entities and
Individuals in the Same Case .................................
164
3. Other Lack of Consistency Within the Same Case .....
168
2.

D.
V.

LACK OF TRANSPARENCY .............................................
170

C ONCLU SION ........................................................
175
I.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") made a
major change to its policy regarding settlements: Instead of routinely settling
matters on a no-admit/no-deny basis, the SEC began to require admissions
from settling respondents and defendants in certain cases., The change was a
reaction to stinging criticism that the agency was willing to sweep wrongdoing
under the rug, or even worse, that it was acting collusively with wrongdoers,
allowing them to escape responsibility for their actions by paying a fine-to
companies, a mere cost of doing business-without ever having to own up to
the wrongfulness of their acts. 2 Former Chair Mary Jo White described the
new policy as a recognition that sometimes "monetary penalties and

1.

See infta Part 1.C.2.

2.

See infra Part I.B.
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compliance enhancements are not enough. An added measure of public
accountability is necessary."3
The new policy marked a radical departure from the way the agency had
traditionally done business, and it was met with considerable consternation
from the defense bar and others who were concerned over its potentially
deleterious consequences. Although Chair White and SEC enforcement staff
insisted that admissions would only be required in egregious cases-and
no-admit/no-deny would otherwise continue to be the norm-many voiced
their concerns over the collateral consequences that admissions could have in
private securities actions, particularly for large, deep-pocketed institutions.4
Such critics predicted that these large institutions would be unwilling to settle
if settling required admissions.5 The result would be an increase in litigation
which could cripple the SEC's enforcement program. 6 When the policy was
first disclosed, one prominent law professor told the Wall StreetJournalthat the
change "would be immense" because admissions could be used in class-action
lawsuits and "[t]he Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanleys of this world... do
not want to admit guilt."7 A defense lawyer, and former SEC enforcement

attorney, told the same publication that the cost of follow-on securities
litigation could be so large that companies might decide to take their chances
battling the SEC in court rather than settling.' The former director of the
SEC's San Francisco office, now a defense lawyer, called the new policy
"troubling," and predicted that in the face of potentially massive collateral
damages, "companies and their officers will be incentivized to take more cases
to trial," straining the SEC's "already limited enforcement resources further"
and leaving "less time to pursue new investigations and shut down ongoing
frauds, with any incremental benefit from seeing bad actors admit their
wrongdoing offset by a delay in any financial recovery for investors (if such
recovery can be had at all)." He concluded that "the SEC has unfortunately
moved in a dangerous direction that could have monumental implications for
the agency's ability to fulfill its core mission of protecting investors.""'
3. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall
Conference: Deploying the Full Enforcement Arsenal (Sept. 26, 2o13) (transcript available at

https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spcho926'3mjw).
4. See infra Part I.D.
5. See infra Part I.D.
6. See infta Part I.D.
7. Jean Eaglesham & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Seeks Admissions of Faul4 WALL ST.J., (June 18,
2013, 8:51 PM) (quoting Professor James Cox), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SBiooo'42412788
732402110457855393187619699 o.
8. Id. (quoting attorney Stephen Crimmins); see also Daniel Fisher, Why Settling with the SEC Can
Be Worse Than Losing at Tria, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2014, 8:13 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/20

9.

4 /o1

/2

9 /why-setding-with-the-sec-can-be-worse-than-losing-at-tial/#6d

(BNA) 1172, 1173 (2013).

lo.

1f834e I 4b5.

Marc Fagel, The SEC's Troubling New Policy RequiringAdmissions, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
Id.at117 5 .
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Now, more than four years on, it is clear that the sky has not fallen. The
SEC's enforcement program remains robust, as the agency continues to
report record numbers of enforcement actions.- Over the years, the new
12
admissions policy has been repeatedly touted by SEC staff as a great success,
and upon Chair White's departure the agency singled out the policy as one of
the signature achievements of her tenure.'s For her part, Chair White has
lauded the admissions policy as "transformative."'4
While the worst fears of the policy's critics have failed to materialize, the
overall success of the policy is open to question, and largely for the same
reason: Consistent with what the SEC stated at the outset, the policy of
requiring admissions has been used sparingly. Since the inception of the
policy, admissions have been obtained in settlements with well under two
percent of the individuals and entities charged over that time period.15 Most
SEC cases continue to settle (rather than go to trial), and the overwhelming
majority of those cases are still settled on a no-admit/no-deny basis.' Because
the policy has been used sparingly-some might sayjudiciously-and because
most defendants and respondents are still allowed to settle without having to
admit wrongdoing, the feared collateral consequences have largely been
avoided.'7 At the same time, because there have been so few admissions, the
goal of public accountability has often remained unmet. More pointedly,
while the SEC stated that the policy was aimed at, and would be used in, the
most egregious cases-presumably those most in need of public
accountability-that has rarely been the case: With a few notable exceptions,
the SEC has not often obtained admissions in cases involving scienter-based

11.
The SEC reported that it brought a record 868 enforcement actions during the 2016
fiscal year, including 548 new standalone actions, and obtained more than $4 billion in
disgorgement and penalties. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY
2016 (Oct. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Press Release, Enforcement Results FY 2o16], https://www.
sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2oi 6-21 2.html.
12.
See, e.g., Andrew Ceresney, Dir. of the Div. of Enftt, SEC, Keynote Address at Compliance
Week 2014 (May 20, 2014) [hereinafter Ceresney, Compliance Week] (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/201 4 -spcho 5 20' 4 ajc); Andrew Ceresney, Dir. of the Div. of Enft,
SEC, Keynote Speech at New York City Bar 4 th Annual White Collar Institute (May 12, 2015)
[hereinafter Ceresney, White Collar Institute] (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/ceresney-nyc-bar-4 th-white-collar-key-note.html).
13. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Chair MaryJo White Announces Departure Plans (Nov. 14,
2016) [hereinafter Press Release, White Departure], https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/
2016-238.html ("To enhance accountability of those who violate the securities laws, Chair White
implemented the Commission's first-ever policy to require admissions of wrongdoing in certain cases
where heightened accountability and acceptance of responsibility is appropriate.").
14.
Mary Jo White, SEC, A New Model for SEC Enforcement: Producing Bold and
Unrelenting Results (Nov. 18, 2o 16) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
chair-white-speech-new-york-university-i s181 6.html).
15. See infra Part III.B. 1.
16. See infra Part III.B. i.
17.
See infra Part III.A.
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fraud, particularly with respect to entities. 18 This may simply be a reflection of

what critics of the new policy said at the outset: that the fear of collateral
consequences would lead more companies to tell the SEC that they would
rather fight than settle. But it strongly suggests that faced with the prospect of
going to trial or settling without an admission, the SEC has caved.
Even more troubling is the inconsistent application of the admissions
policy. The SEC has given little guidance as to when admissions will be
required, and what little guidance there is provides almost no clue as to why
the SEC has obtained admissions in some cases and not others.'9 Cases that
appear on their face to be extremely similar have yielded vastly different
results.2o An analysis of the relevant settlements, and a comparison with cases
where admissions were not obtained, yields no discernable pattern.2

1

The

problem is compounded by the fact that the SEC has largely failed to explain
why it deemed admissions necessary in certain cases but unnecessary in
others.22 The lack of clear standards, consistency, and transparency has
undermined the fairness and effectiveness of the policy, and has bred
cynicism that the SEC may be using the threat of a required admission to
extract higher penalties in settlements.23
Moreover, the one trend that has emerged is unsettling. It appears that
the SEC is typically seeking admissions from large financial institutions in
cases where no individuals are being charged and where there is no realistic
possibility of collateral consequences such as criminal charges, private class
actions, or regulatory sanctions.2 4The lack of individual charges is particularly
jarring, given that the entity that is making the admission can only act through
the individuals that comprise it. If accountability is the goal, it would seem to
require some measure of individual accountability. At the same time,
requiring admissions only in cases where collateral consequences are remote
or non-existent leads to an odd result: Either admissions are not being sought
with respect to the most egregious misconduct, or cases of egregious
misconduct are being settled with an admission to a less serious charge.
In Part II of this Article, I briefly trace the evolution of the SEC's policy
concerning admissions in settlements, the genesis of the adoption of the
current policy, the stated scope and application of the policy, and the critical
reaction to the policy. In Part III of this Article, I provide some analysis of the
cases to date where admissions have been obtained, including a breakdown
of the types of cases and charges. In Part IV of this Article, I offer an
18.

See infra Parts III.B. 2, W.A.

19.

See infra Part V.B.

20.

See infra Part W.C.

21.

See infta Part V.C.

22.
23.

See infra Part IV.D.
See, e.g., BradleyJ. Bondi, An Evaluation of the SEC's Admissons Policy, CR. FOR FIN. STABILIIY

24.

See infta Part IV.C.

(July 7, 2o16), http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/research/Bondio7o7

1 6.pd f.
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assessment and critique of the admissions policy, focusing in particular on the
dearth of serious charges, and the lack of clear standards, consistency, and
transparency. I conclude that the while the new admissions policy has not
caused the harm that critics originally feared, it has failed to deliver any
noticeable benefits, while breeding cynicism of the agency's methods. I
suggest that the SEC should provide clear guidance and greater transparency
to explain its use in particular cases, and needs to apply the policy more
consistently. Failing that, the policy should be reconsidered or abandoned
altogether.
II.

THE GENESIS OF THE ADMISSIONS POLICY

When the admissions policy was announced in 2013, it upended over

years of SEC practice whereby defendants and respondents were allowed
(and for all intents and purposes, required) to settle enforcement actions on
a neither admit nor deny basis. The change in policy was rooted in widespread
public criticism-in particular, judicial criticism-of the agency in the wake
of the financial crisis of 2008.25 Critics voiced concerns that the SEC may have
been acting collusively with the financial services industry it was supposed to
regulate.26 Specifically, critics accused the agency of deliberately sweeping
serious wrongdoing under the rug by allowing large financial institutions to
settle matters by paying relatively small fines and never admitting liability or
owning up to their misdeeds.27 Before describing the genesis of the policy
switch, it is worth recalling the circumstances behind the adoption of the noadmit/no-deny policy, which were similarly rooted in public criticism of the
agency, albeit of a quite different sort.
40

A.

NO-ADMIT/NO-DENY

The SEC officially adopted the no-admit/no-deny policy in 1972.28 The
policy is not a part of the SEC's formal "Rules of Practice," but is codified

among the SEC's "Informal and Other Procedures."29 It should also be noted
that despite the fact that the agency now requires admissions in certain cases,
the no-admit/no-deny policy remains in effect.3o The no-admit/no-deny
policy was adopted principally out of concern that defendants and
respondents were entering into consent decrees and then publicly denying

See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part H.B.
See infta Part II.B.
27.
28.
See Consent Decrees in Judicial or Administrative Proceedings, Securities Act Release
No. 33-5337, 37 Fed. Reg. 25,224 (Nov. 28, 1972).
29. SEC Informal and Other Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2012). "Informal" procedures
are supplements to the "formal" procedures found in statutes, rules, regulations and forms, and
are "designed to aid the public and facilitate the execution of the Commission's functions"
although they "have not been formalized in rules." Id. § 202.1 (c).
3o. See id. § 202.5.
25.

2017]

ADMISSIONS IN SEC ENFORCEMENT CASES

that they had done anything wrong or violated any law or regulation.31
Defendants and respondents would claim that there was no basis for the
enforcement action and that they were settling the matter only to avoid the
expense and hassle of litigation brought upon by an over-zealous, overbearing, and very powerful government agency.32 The no-admit/no-deny
policy reflected a concern that the public might buy in to this narrative and
conclude that the SEC was acting arbitrarily, or worse unlawfully, which would
undermine the agency's integrity and compromise its ability to protect the
investing public.33 The purpose of the policy, in other words, was to avoid the
perception that the SEC had entered into a settlement when there was not in
fact a violation.34
The policy the SEC adopted provides in relevant part:
[The Commission] hereby announces its policy not to permit a
defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that
imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or
order for proceedings. In this regard, the Commission believes that
a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the
defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor denies
the allegations.35
The no-admit/no-deny policy leaves open the possibility that defendants or
respondents might admit the facts in the complaint or order, but does not
require them to do so. On the other hand, it flatly prohibits them from
denying the factual allegations in the complaint or order. Since adopting the
policy, the Commission has required defendants and respondents to state in
the offer of settlement or consent that they are neither admitting nor denying
the allegations, and to acknowledge that they understand that the SEC may
seek to revoke the settlement if they subsequently fail to abide by its terms
6
through a public denial.3

31.
See SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 304, 3o8-1o (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(describing the origins of the no-admit/no-deny policy).
32.
Id. at 3o8-so.
33. Id.
34. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) ("The Commission has adopted the policy that in any civil
lawsuit brought by it or in any administrative proceeding of an accusatory nature pending before
it, it is important to avoid creating, or permitting to be created, an impression that a decree is
being entered or a sanction imposed, when the conduct alleged did not, in fact, occur.").
35. Id.
36. The consent will typically include a clause stating that "Defendant agrees ... not to take
any action or to make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly,
any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual
basis" and adding that "[i]f Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition
the Court to vacate the Final Judgment and restore this action to its active docket." See, e.g.,
Consent of Goldman, Sachs & Co. at 8-9, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 1o-CV-3229
(S.D.N.Y.July 14, 2010).
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CRITICISM OFNO-ADMIT/NO-DENY

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, the SEC's concern that the
public might come to believe that it was being over-zealous and bringing
enforcement actions against innocent defendants gave way to a new concern
that the public might believe that the agency was acting collusively with
wrongdoers and allowing them to escape serious punishment with a slap on
the wrist.37
Indignation with what were perceived to be weak settlements was
particularly acute in cases involving large financial institutions that were
thought, rightly or wrongly, to have played a role in the collapse of the
financial markets. In one prominent example involving Bank of America's
acquisition of Merrill Lynch at the height of the financial crisisJudge Rakoff,
of the Southern District of NewYork, rebuked the SEC and refused to approve
a consent judgment in part because it did not contain any admissions of
wrongdoing, and therefore did not get to the "truth."38 Judge Rakoff set the
case for trial.39 Judge Rakoff's stand, which garnered much public support,
started the ball rolling towards a re-evaluation of the no-admit/no-deny
policy. The SEC and Bank of America subsequently re-settled the case, and
the SEC submitted a consent judgment for court approval that provided for a
higher monetary penalty and included a lengthy recitation of facts; notably,
Bank of America acknowledged that "there [was] an evidentiary basis" for
those facts.40Judge Rakoff quite reluctantly approved the consent judgment,
in part because it offered a "much better developed statement of facts,"
although he called the settlement "half-baked justice at best."4'
Following the Bank of America case, other federal judges began to
question no-admit/no-deny settlements. For example, Judge Victor Marrero,
of the Southern District of New York, questioned a proposed settlement in a
case that the SEC brought against a unit of SAC Capital, the giant hedge fund
owned by Steven Cohen, because it allowed the defendant to neither admit

37.
See e.g., David Callahan, Crime Pays: The SECs Slap on the WristforAngelo Mozilo, HUFFTNGTON
POST: THE BLOG (Oct. 17, 2010, 12:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-callahan/crimepays-the-secs-slap-b_76 5 5 26.html; John Hudson, Why Goldman's $ 5 5 oM Settlement Is Barely a Wrist Slap,

THE ATLANTIC (July 16, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2o1o/o7/whygoldman-s-55om-settlement-is-barely-a-wrist-slap/344856; Matt Taibbi, JP Morgan Chase Fine: Another
Slap on the Wristfor Wall Street, ROLLING STONE (July 8, 2011), http://www.roUingstone.com/politics/

news/jp-morgan-chase-fine-another-slap-on-thewrist-for-wall-street-2o 110708.
38.

See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507,

512

(S.D.N.Y. 2oo9). Full disclosure:

I worked on this matter as a lawyer for the SEC.
39. Id.
40.
See Final ConsentJudgment as to Defendant Bank of America Corp. at 14, SEC v. Bank

of Am. Corp., No. o9 -CV-682 9 & No. 1o-CV-021 5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Statement of Facts, Final
Consent Judgment as to Defendant Bank of America Corp., SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No.
o9-CV-682 9 &No. 1o-CV-o21 5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
41.
See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. o 9 -CV-682 9 , No. 1o-CV-0215, 201o WL 624581, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010).
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nor deny the charges: "There is something counterintuitive and incongruous
about settling for $6oo million if it truly did nothing wrong," the judge said.42
Judge Marrero ultimately approved the settlement, while still expressing
misgivings about no-admit/no-deny.43 Other judges also began to question
the policy and closely scrutinize SEC consent decrees, sometimes demanding
additional factual submissions before approving settlements.44
In 201 iJudge Rakoff again rejected an SEC consentjudgment. The SEC
and Citigroup had reached an agreement to settle a case involving fraudulent
conduct with respect to a fund of mortgage-backed securities, with a monetary
penalty of $285 million on a no-admit/no-deny basis.45 Judge Rakoff refused
to approve the settlement, calling the penalty "pocket change to any entity as
large as Citigroup,"46 and again bemoaning the fact that the settlement did
not include "any proven or admitted facts upon which to exercise even a
modest degree of independent judgment."47 Judge Rakoff concluded that if
"deployment [of the injunctive power of thejudiciary] does not rest on factscold, hard, solid facts, established either by admissions or by trials-it serves
no lawful or moral purpose and is simply an engine of oppression," and set
the case for trial.48 This time, however, the SEC appealed Judge Rakoffs
decision, which was ultimately overturned.49
C.

THF NEWADMISSIONS POLICY

1. Convictions, Pleas, and Admissions in Parallel Actions
Change to the SEC's policy on admissions came piecemeal, starting with
two classes of cases where the standard no-admit/no-deny language was
dropped from consent judgments. First, in December 2011, the SEC's
Division of Enforcement began to exclude the no-admit/no-deny language
from settlements in which there had been a parallel criminal conviction or

See Peter Lattman,JudgeIsSkeptical of S.E.C. Deal with Hedge Fund,N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
42.
(Mar. 28, 2013, 1:26 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2o1 3 /o 3 /28/udge-questions-s-e-csettlement-with-steven-cohens-hedge-fund.
43.

SECv. CR Intrinsic Investors, LLC., 939 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

44.
See, e.g., SEC v. Hohol, No. 1 4 -C-4 1, 201 4 WL 1330299 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2014) (granting
motion for entry of final judgment); SECv. Hohol, No. 14 -C-4 1, 2014 WL 4 6121 7 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 5,
2014) (declining to enter proposed judgment as presented and requiring that the SEC supplement its
filings); Michael C. Macchiarola, "Hallowed by History, But Not By Reason":.JudgeRakoffs Critique of the
Secunities and Exchange Commission's Consent Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L. REV. 51, 9-92
(2012)

(discussing the copycat effect ofJudge Rakoff's refusal to approve settlements).
45.
See Press Release, SEC, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading

Investors About CDO Tied to Housing Market (Oct. 19, 201 1),https://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2011/2011-21 4 .htm.
46.

SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 201 1).

48.

Id. at 335.

49.

SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 752 F. 3 d 285, 289-98 (2d Cir. 2014).

47.

Id. at 330.
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guilty plea concerning the same underlying conduct.5o In July 2012, the
Division of Enforcement also began to exclude the no-admit/no-deny
language in cases where there was a parallel regulatory settlement in which
the defendant or respondent had admitted to liability, or admitted certain
significant facts.5, In settling these cases, the consent or offer made reference
to the fact of the parallel criminal conviction or plea, or to the parallel
regulatory settlement, and on occasion even recited the relevant facts
established by allocution, a trier of fact, or by some other admission or
acknowledgment of the defendant or respondent.52
Although this constituted a change in approach, it was relatively
uncontroversial for a couple of reasons. First, it did not actually require
defendants and respondents to make admissions in connection with the SEC
settlement.5s Second, these cases necessarily involved situations where the
defendant or respondent had already been found guilty in a criminal case, or
had made a public admission of guilt (in the form of an allocution), or had
otherwise made a public admission of liability with respect to the same
underlying conduct; as such, there was no practical effect with respect to the
defendant or respondent. For this same reason, however, the SEC's decision
to exclude the no-admit/no-deny language in those cases added nothing in
the way of public accountability; the change was strictly about optics and a
desire to reconcile the glaring anomaly of having defendants and respondents
settling civil and administrative charges on a no-admit/no-deny basis when
they had already made admissions concerning the same conduct, including
admissions of guilt in criminal cases.
2.

Admissions in SEC Settlements

In June 2 013, then-Chair White announced that going forward the SEC
would require admissions as a condition of settlement in certain cases.54 Chair
White explained that while most settlements would continue to be done on a
no-admit/no-deny basis, in certain cases where there was a need for greater
public accountability, the SEC would require admissions, even if that made it
5o . Robert Khuzami, Dir. of the SEC's Div. of Enft, SEC, Public Statement by SEC Staff: Recent
Policy Change (Jan. 7, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2o 12-spcholo712rskhtm.
SeeAndrew Ceresney, Co-Director of the Div. of Enft, SEC, Speech at the American Law
51.
Institute Continuing Legal Education in Washington, D.C.: Financial Reporting and Accounting
Fraud (Sept. 19, 2013) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spcho
91913ac) ("We recently modified our traditional approach in cases where there has been a
criminal or regulatory settlement with admissions. In such cases, we have eliminated the no
admit/no deny language and referenced the admissions.").
See Khuzami, supra note 50 (outlining facts concerning prior conviction or regulatory
52.
settlement to be included in SEC settlement).
53. Even where facts that had previously been adjudged or admitted were specifically
recited, the offer or consent simply stated that in a separate proceeding the defendant or
respondent had admitted certain things.
54. Eaglesham & Ackerman, supra note 7.
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more difficult or impossible to achieve a negotiated resolution.55 In a speech
in September 2013, Chair White specified that the new approach would apply
in cases "where there is a special need for public accountability and
acceptance of responsibility."5 6 As Chair White explained, in the ordinary
case, the no-admit/no-deny policy made sense because it allowed the SEC to
obtain relief within the range of what the agency could hope to obtain at trial,
while avoiding the risks, allowing the agency to conserve resources and obtain
a speedier resolution that could benefit harmed investors.57 In certain cases,
however, Chair White noted that "more may be required for a resolution to
be, and to be viewed as, a sufficient punishment and strong deterrent
message."58 In the same speech, Chair White broadly outlined four categories
of cases where admissions might be required: (1) "Cases where a large
number of investors have been harmed or the conduct was otherwise
egregious"; (2) "Cases where the conduct posed a significant risk to the
market or investors"; (3) "Cases where admissions would aid investors
deciding whether to deal with a particular party in the future"; and (4)"Cases
where reciting unambiguous facts would send an important message to the
market about a particular case."59 Chair White reiterated that "no-admit-nodeny settlements are a very important tool" that the SEC would "continue to
use when we believe it is in public interest to do so. In other cases, we will be
'
requiring admissions. 6o

The decision to require admissions in certain cases was undoubtedly
propelled by judicial and other public criticism of the no-admit/no-deny
policy.6 ' The decision was also likely motivated by a fear of ajudicial takeover
55.

Were the SEC Action Wil Be, WALL ST. J., (June 24, 2013, 4:03 PM), https://www.wj.

com/articles/SBloOO1424127887323893 50 4 5 78 5 5 5 99o8 4 5 9262 4 (In an interview, Chair White
said: "[W]e are going to in certain cases be seeking admissions going forward. Public accountability in
particular kinds of cases can be quite important, and if you don't get them, you litigate them.").
56. White, supra note 3; see also Ceresney, supra note 51 ("But there also is a group of cases
where a public airing of unambiguous facts-whether through admissions or a trial-serve such
an important public interest that we will demand admissions, and if the defendant is not prepared
to admit the conduct, litigate the case at trial. I analogize it to a guilty plea in a criminal casethere is a certain amount of accountability that comes from a defendant admitting to
unambiguous, uncontested facts. It is in many respects a cathartic moment. And there can be no
denying the facts under those circumstances.").
57. White, supra note 3.
58. Id.
59. Id.
6o. Id.
61. In an interview, Chair White denied that Judge Rakoff had been the motivating factor:
'Judge Rakoff and other judges put this issue more in the public eye, but it wasn't his comments
that precipitated the change." SeeJames B. Stewart, S.E.C. Has a Messagefor FirmsNot Used to Admitting
Guit, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/201 3 /o6/22/business/secs-new-chiefpromises-tougher-line-on-cases.html. Nonetheless, it is fairly clear that Judge Rakoff's criticism set
the ball rolling and that combined with other public criticism it was the impetus behind the
adoption of the policy. See, e.g., Paul Radvany, The SECAdds aNew Weapon: HowDoes the New Admission
Requirement Change the Landscape?, 15 CARDOZOJ. CONFLICrRESOL. 665, 676-88 (2014) (describing
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of the SEC settlement process. 62 The SEC may have viewed its approach of
only sometimes requiring admissions as a way to mollify critics while retaining
control and flexibility. As Chair White insisted when she formally announced
the policy, "[t] hese decisions are for [the SEC] to make within our discretion,
6
not decisions for a court to make." 3

Finally, it should be noted that while the decision to sometimes require
admissions is typically referred to as SEC "policy," including in SEC
communications 64 (and herein), the Commission never formally adopted
such a policy. Unlike the no-admit/no-deny policy, which was approved by the
Commission as a whole, and is in the Code of Federal Regulations (albeit as
an "Informal Procedure" rather than a "Rule of Practice"),65 the admissions
"policy" was never voted on or otherwise formally approved by the whole
Commission, 66 nor has it been codified or otherwise made an official part of
either the SEC's Rules of Practice or its "Informal and Other Procedures."
Strictly speaking, it is not, and never was, SEC "policy." Nevertheless, the SEC
refers to it as agency policy, and this Article treats it as such.
D.

CR[ITCISM AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE ADMISSIONS POLICY

The new admissions policy was greeted with considerable skepticism by
the industry, the defense bar, and even academics. The announcement was
described as a "bombshell," and the policy as "troubling." 67 Many predicted

the origin of the admissions policy shift); Jason E. Siegel, Admit It! CorporateAdmissions of Wrongdoing
in SEC Settlements: Evaluating CollateralEstppelEffects, 103 GEO. LJ. 433,438-42 (2015) (same).
SeeJean Eaglesham & Chad Bray, Citi Ruling Could Chill SEC, Street Legal Pacts,WALL ST.J.
62.
(Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 0014240529702039356o4577o6624244
863556o (discussing possibility of losing control of the settlement process).
63. White, supra note 3.
64. See, e.g., Press Release, White Departure, supra note 13 ("Chair White implemented the
Commission's first-ever policy to require admissions of wrongdoing in certain cases....").
65. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2016). The no-admit/no-deny policy is really a no-deny policy: there
is nothing in the regulation that prohibits admissions, and indeed the regulation specifically
contemplates the possibility of admissions. Id. § 202.5(e) The no-admit part comes in because
the Commission considers that "a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless
the defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations." Id. This
remains the official policy of the Commission.
66. Individual settlements which include admissions have, of course, been voted on and
approved by the Commission. It's just that the "policy" of sometimes requiring admissions has
never been formally voted on or approved by the Commission as a whole, and it has never been
codified. In addition to Chair White, some individual commissioners have expressed approval of
the admissions requirement. See, e.g., Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Speech at the 2oth Annual
Securities Litigation and Regulatory Enforcement Seminar, Atlanta, Georgia: A Stronger
Enforcement Program to Enhance Investor Protection (Oct. 25, 2013) (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2o 13-spch 1o25131aa).
67. Fagel, supra note 9, at 1173.

2017]

ADMISSIONS IN SEC ENFORCEMENT CASES

that requiring admissions would be "costly" for the agency. 6 The principal
concern was over the possible collateral consequences of admissions in
connection with SEC actions. Defense lawyers warned that admissions could
be used to establish liability in private class actions. 69 Plaintiff class action
lawyers relished the thought, and were reportedly "optimistic" about the new
policy.7o Some lawyers worried about whether admissions could give rise to
potential criminal liability.7' Many predicted that the result would be that
entities in particular would be extremely reluctant to make admissions in
connection with settlements, even if it meant enduring the risks and expense
of going to trial.72 In the end, many predicted that the natural consequence
of the new policy would be fewer negotiated resolutions and more trials.73
Increased litigation, they warned, would not only be harmful and inefficient
from the industry perspective, but it would also gobble up the Commission's
scarce resources.74 The SEC's Division of Enforcement would be particularly
hard hit because it would have to shift its focus to trial work, leaving it unable
to properly investigate new legal violations.75

68.

See David Zaring, Requiring Defendants To Admit Guilt Will Be Costly for S.E. C., N.Y. TIMES:

DEALBOOK (July 2, 2013, 1:27 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2o13/07/02/requiring-

defendants-to-admit-guilt-will-be-costly-for-s-e-c.
69.
See Marc H. Axelbaum et al., Admit It! SEC May Seek Admissions of Wrongdoing in Settlements,
PILLSBURY WIN-rHROP SHAW P1TrMAN LLP (June 25, 2013), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/newsand-insights/admit-it-sec-may-seek-admissions-of-wrongdoing-in-setdements.htnl.
70.
SeeAlison Frankel, ShouldDefendants FearNewSECPolicy on Admissions in Settlements? REUTERs
(June 19, 2013, 6:oi PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS249 7 21 22812013o619 (noting that
securities lawyers seemed "optimistic about the impact of the new policy on their cases"); see also
Matthew G. Neumann, Note, Neither Admit Nor Deny: Recent Changes to the Securities and Exchange
Comnission'sLongstandingSettlement Policy, 40J. COPP. L. 793, 8o8 (2015) ("Even if private litigants are
unable ... to assert collateral estoppel, an admission in a previous SEC settlement may increase the
likelihood of success at trial, or make it less likely that a judge will dismiss a lawsuit prior to
adjudication.").
71.
See Kurt Orzeck, SEC To Seek More Admissions of Guilt in Settlements, LAW3 6o (June 18,
2013, 11:41 PM), https://www.law36o.com/articles/ 4 5 1302/sec-to-seek-more-admissions-of-gultin-settlements.
72. See, e.g., Michael Mugmon & Chris Johnstone, Some Prefer Litigation When the SEC Calls,
DAiLYJoURNAL (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared Content/
Editorial/Publications/Documents/daily-j ournal-some-prefer-litigaion-wher. -SEC-calls.pdf ("The
adverse and unpredictable consequences of an admission will mean many clients will be forced to
choose litigation over settlement."); Stewart, supra note 61 ("Any admission is likely to be seized upon
by private litigants in civil lawsuits, including class actions, with potentially devastating financial
consequences.").
73. SeeRadvany, supra note 61, at 701-03.
74. See Fagel, supra note 9, at 1 174 (suggesting that the new policy would divert resources
from opening new investigations into funding litigation).
75.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., 'NeitherAdmit Nor Deny': PracticalImplications of SECs New Policy,
COLUM. L. SCH.: THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 22, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2013/07/22/neither-admit-nor-deny-practical-implications-of-secs-new-policy;
Thomas A. Zaccaro,
SEC's Guilt Admission Policy May Bring Pricey Trials, LAW3 6o (July 3, 2013, 1:40 PM), https://www.
law36o.com/articles/454587/sec--guilt-admission-policy-may-bring-pricey-trials
("Given the SEC's
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The SEC's admissions policy was particularly troubling to those who
viewed it in combination with the judiciary's increasingly activist review of
consent decrees.76 Some voiced concern that they would be forced into
making admissions in SEC settlements because even if they managed to settle
on a no-admit/no-deny basis, a court could refuse to approve the consent
judgment and force the case to trial.77
E.

TiEJuDIcL AFTERM TH

Ironically, shortly after the SEC announced the new admissions policy,
the Second Circuit decided the SEC's appeal of Judge Rakoff's refusal to
approve the consent judgment in the Citigroup case. The Second Circuit
made clear that courts cannot require admissions in order to approve SEC
consentjudgments, and found thatJudge Rakoff had "abused [his] discretion
by applying an incorrect legal standard in assessing the consent decree and
setting a date for trial."7 The Second Circuit held

that the proper standard for reviewing a proposed consentjudgment
involving an enforcement agency requires that the district court
determine whether the proposed consent decree is fair and
reasonable, with the additional requirement that the "public interest
would not be disserved," in the event that the consent decree
includes injunctive relief.79
The court went on to say that "[a ] bsent a substantial basis in the record for
concluding that the proposed consent decree does not meet these
requirements, the district court is required to enter the order,"so In
determining whether a proposed consent decree is "fair and reasonable" the
district court should focus on the procedural adequacy of the settlement,
"taking care not to infringe on the SEC's discretionary authority to settle on a
finite resources, the possibility of more trials resulting from application of the new policy could
significantly limit the number of enforcement actions that the SEC pursues each year.").
76. See, e.g., Ben ProtessJudge Rakoff Says 2011 S.E.C. Deal with CitigroupCan Close, NYTIMES:
DEALBOOK (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:o PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2o 4 /o8/05/after-longfight-judge-rakoff-reluctantly-approves-citigroup-deal ("The [SEC policy] shift alarmed Wall
Street and the white-collar bar. At oral arguments before the appeals court in the Citigroup case
...a lawyer for the bank ... warned that admissions could open the floodgates to shareholder
lawsuits. 'The federal regulatory enforcement regime would screech to a grinding halt,' [the
lawyer] remarked.").
77. Doug Greene, SEC's Shift inNo-Admit-or-Deny Policy Would CreateDilemmaforDefendantsifApplied
in Close Cases, LANE POWELL (June 25, 2013), http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2 os3/o6/25/secsshift-in-no-admit-or-deny-policy-would-create-dilemma-for-defendants-if-applied-in-close-cases
("The
uncertainty surrounding judicial review of no-admit-or-deny settlements is a wild card-increased
judicial insistence on admissions likely would prompt the SEC to apply its [new admissions] policy to
more cases than it otherwise would.").
78.
SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 752 F. 3 d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014).
79. Id. at 294 (citation omitted).
8o. Id.
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particular set of terms."' 1 When the agency is seeking injunctive relief as part
of a settlement, courts should also assess whether the settlement is in "the
public interest," but "[t]he job of determining whether the proposed SEC
consent decree best serves the public interest, however, rests squarely with the
8
SEC, and its decision merits significant deference." 2
Most important, the Second Circuit held "[i] t is an abuse of discretion to
require, as the district court did here, that the SEC establish the 'truth' of the
allegations against a settling party as a condition for approving the consent
decrees. Trials are primarily about the truth. Consent decrees are primarily
about pragmatism."83 The court went on to say that "[i]t is not within the
district court's purview to demand 'cold, hard, solid facts, established either
by admissions or by trials,' as to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
as a condition for approving a consent decree."84 On remand, Judge Rakoff,
again quite reluctantly, approved the original settlement.85
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

SECENFORCEMEffBY THE NUMBERS

Despite fears that the new admissions policy could compromise the
effectiveness of the SEC's enforcement program, the agency has continued to
bring enforcement actions at a record pace. In fiscal 2016, the SEC brought
' 6
a total of 868 enforcement actions, described as a "new single year high,"
against 1,7oo defendants and respondents.7 This includes a "record 548
standalone or independent enforcement actions." s The 2016 numbers
followed two similarly productive years, and showed steady growth: In fiscal
2015, the agency brought a total of 807 enforcement actions, and in fiscal
2014, the agency brought a total of 755 enforcement actions.89 Enforcement
actions for the past three fiscal years are detailed in the following chart, which
lists new civil matters, new or standalone administrative proceedings

81.

Id.at 295.

82.

Id. at296.

83.
84.

Id. at 295 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).

85.

86.

SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 34 F. Supp. 3 d 379, 38o (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Press Release, Enforcement Results FY 2016, supra note ii.
87.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FIsCAL. 2o16, at 3 (2017)
[hereinafter SELECT SEC DATA 2o16], https://www.sec.gov/fdles/20 17-03/secstatS2o 1 6.pdf.

88.
89.

Press Release, Enforcement Results for FY 2o16, supra note 11.
SEC.

&

ExCH. COMM'N.,

SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2014, at 3

(2015)

[hereinafter SELECT SEC DATA 2014], https://www.sec.gov/files/secstats2o 14 .pdf; SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N., SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 20 15, at 3 (2o 16) [hereinafter SELECT SEC DATA

20151, https://www.sec.gov/files/secstats2o 15 .pdf.
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(excluding delinquent filing cases), follow-on administrative proceedings,
delinquent filing cases, and totals.9o
Table i. SEC Enforcement Actions FY 2014-2016
Year

204

2015

2016

216

New Civil

Cases
.... .

145

162

176

483

Def.

476

672

595

1743

NewAP w/o

Cases

268

345

372

536

1456

Tota New

Cases

413

507

548

1468

D&R

866

1202

1131

3199

Cases
.
Res.

232

168

195

595

242

173

203

618

Cases

110
453

132

125

367

455

366

1274

Cases
...........

755

807

868

2430

D&R

1561

1830

1700

5091

Del. Fil.

Follow-on AP
Delinquent
FiingAP
Toa"l"

Res.

Res.

390

530

985

The number of enforcement matters the SEC brought during the last
three fiscal years reflects a net increase over the numbers for the three fiscal
years prior to the adoption of the admissions policy, and those three years
were themselves record setting. In fiscal 2010, the SEC brought a total of 681
matters; in fiscal 201 1, the SEC brought a total of 735 matters; and in fiscal
2012, the SEC brought a total of 734 matters.9,

go. Except as noted below, the data in the chart comes from: SELECT SEC DATA 2014;
SELECT SEC DATA 2015; SELECT SEC DATA 2o16. The number for follow-on administrative
proceedings for fiscal 2014 is found in Press Release, Enforcement Results for FY 2016, supra
note 11. The total number of respondents in follow-on and standalone administrative
proceedings for fiscal 2014 (632) is derived from SELECT SEC DATA 2014 and is accurate;
however, the break-down of respondents as between follow-on and standalone administrative
proceedings for that year is an estimate.
91.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 201o, at 3 (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2o1o.pdf; SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., SELECT SEC AND MARKET

DATA FISCAL 2011, at 3 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2oll.pdf; SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N., SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2012, at 3 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/
secstats2O 2.pdf.
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Oddly, the numbers for fiscal 2013, the year the admissions policy was
)2
adopted, show a slight dip: That year the SEC brought a total of 676 matters.
It is unclear whether this slowdown was connected in any way to the
announcement of the new policy: The policy was first disclosed in late June of
2013, three-quarters of the way through the fiscal year, and there were only
two admissions cases brought during that fiscal year. It is possible, of course,
that the new policy created uncertainty among defendants and the defense
bar, which may have contributed to a more cautious approach to settlements.
In any event, the agency quickly rebounded in fiscal 2014 with an 11.7%
increase in total enforcement matters brought.
Looking at the numbers alone, it seems fairly clear then that the new
admissions policy has had no noticeable adverse effects on the agency's ability
to bring enforcement actions.93 The SEC continues to aggressively investigate
and prosecute violations of the federal securities laws and has not been slowed
down by requiring admissions as the price of settlement in certain cases.
B.
i.

THE ADMiSSIONS CASES

The Admissions Cases by the Numbers

The SEC's admissions policy has now been in place for over four years,
and it may be said to have achieved a level of maturity that makes numerical
assessments meaningful. Since the new policy was put in place and through
February 15, 2017, the SEC obtained admissions from 49 legally distinct

92.
SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N., SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FIScAL 2013, at 3 (2014),
https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2o 13 .pdf.
93. The SEC's method of calculating enforcement numbers has been severely criticized for
including such things as follow-on proceedings, contempt proceedings, and delinquent filings

cases, and for double-counting defendants and respondents. Thus, whether the SEC is continuing
to set new records with respect to enforcement matters is, at the very least, a matter of some
debate. See Urska Velikonja, ReportingAgency Performance:Behind the SEC's Enforcement Statistics, i o 1
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 932-47 (2016). My only point here is that looking at the numbers yearover-year it does not appear that requiring admissions has had any impact on the agency's ability
to bring enforcement actions.
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entities94 and 30 individuals, in connection with 57 separately filed
enforcement actions.95
As low as these numbers are, they may overstate the real extent of
admissions. First, for a variety of reasons, the SEC sometimes brings multiple
enforcement "actions" with respect to the same underlying misconduct. When
these actions are consolidated, the total number of actual cases where there
was some kind of admission is more accurately described as 52.96 Second, in
several instances, a single enforcement "action" included two or more clearly
related, although legally distinct, settling entities that made admissions.97
When multiple related entities that made admissions in connection with the
same filing are counted as one, the number of admitting entities is more
realistically viewed as being approximately 39.98
Attached as an Appendix hereto is a chart listing all of the enforcement
actions through February 15, 2017, that resulted in one or more settlements

94. Three entities made admissions with respect to more than one matter: Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., and Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp. each made
admissions. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,141, 2016
WL 4363431, at *3 (June 23, 2016); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., and Merrill
Lynch Prof'l Clearing Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 75,083, 2015 WL 3452968 (June i,
2015). Credit Suisse AG made two admissions. Credit Suisse AG, Securities Act Release No.
10,299, Exchange Act Release No. 79,044, 2016 WL 5800369 (Oct. 5, 2016); Credit Suisse Grp.
AG, Exchange Act Release No. 71,593, io8 SEC Docket 1233 (Feb. 21, 2o14). One entity,
Orthofix, made admissions in two separate orders that were issued on the same day. Orthofix

Int'l, N.V., Securities Act Release No. 10,281, Exchange Act Release No. 79,815, 2017 WL
192377 (Jan. 18, 2017); Orthofix Int'l, N.V., Exchange Act Release No. 79,828, 2017 WL 192393

(Jan. 18, 2017). These four entities have been counted only once each in the total. However, for
this total, I have counted legally distinct, but clearly related entities, twice (e.g., Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) is a subsidiary of Credit Suisse Group AG, but is counted separately here).
95. See infraAppendix.
96. There were two filings with respect to the Falcone/Harbinger matter. Complaint, SEC
v. Falcone, No. 12-CV-5 027 (S.D.N.Y June 27, 2013) [hereinafter Falcone Complaint];
Complaint, SEC v. Harbinger Capital Partners LLC, No. 12-CV- 5 028 (S.D.N.YJune 27, 2012)
[hereinafter Harbinger Complaint]. The filings were in fact later consolidated and settled
together. Similarly, there were three separate matters brought against individuals relating to the
same misconduct involved in the separately filed ConvergEx matter. See Lax, Exchange Release
No. 7 4 , 5 82, 2o5 WL 1324391, at *1 (Mar. 11, 201 5 ); G-Trade Servs. LLC, Exchange Act Release
No. 71,128, 107 SEC Docket 5418, 5418 (Dec. 18, 2013); Lekargeren, Exchange Act Release
No. 71,127, Investment Company Act Release No. 3o,839, 117 SEC Docket 5414, 5415 (Dec. 18,
2013); Daspin, Exchange Act Release No. 71,126, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,838,
117 SEC Docket 5409, 5410 (Dec. 18, 2013). There were also two filings in the Orthofix matter.
Orthofix Int'l, N.V., 2017 WL 192377, at *; Orthofix Int'l, N.V., 2017 WL 192393, at *i.

97. For example, there were three legally distinct, but clearly connected, entities in the Bank
Leumi case, all of which settled at one time using the same consent involving the same admissions.
See Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., Exchange Act Release No. 79,113, 2016 WL 6o81797, at *3 (Oct.
18, 2o16). The same is true with respect to several other settlements (e.g., the three Harbinger
entities; the three ConvergEx entities; the two Merrill Lynch entities, etc.).
98. This number still counts legally distinct entities that made admissions in separate
enforcement actions twice.
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that included some form of admission, with the names of the admitting
individual and entity defendants and respondents.
The most important thing to note at the outset is how infrequently the
SEC has obtained admissions. There are various metrics that can be used as
points of comparison-described below-but even using the most generous
measure, the SEC has obtained admissions in roughly 2.7% of the new
standalone matters it has brought in the three full years that the policy has
been in place, from less than 2% of the defendants and respondents it sued
in those cases. Using the narrower measure, the number is less than 2 % of all
matters and 1.25% of all defendants and respondents.
The time frame in which the admissions policy has been in place
encompasses four full fiscal years (FY2o1 4 , FY201 5 , FY2016, FY201 7 ), and
part of one other (FY2o13).99 Fiscal 2013 can safely be ignored: The policy
was introduced late in the fiscal year and there were only two cases involving
admissions that fall within that period. Fiscal 2017 has just concluded, but
there is as yet no data set with overall numbers for comparison purposes. The
three complete fiscal years for which comparative data exists (the "Relevant
Period"), however, provide a very good basis for measuring how often the SEC
has obtained admissions. It is also a large enough period to include most of
the admissions cases that have been brought to date, including several cases
in which the action was brought during one of the fiscal years in the Relevant
Period but admissions were obtained during a different fiscal year in the
Relevant Period.
There are a few different data points that can be used for comparison,
ranging from all matters the SEC brought during this time frame, at one
extreme, to subsets that include only new standalone matters, excluding
follow-on proceedings and matters pertaining to delinquent filings, at the
other extreme. We will examine each in turn, along with some possible
intermediate points.
During the Relevant Period, the SEC brought a total of 2,430 matters
against a total of 5,091 defendants and respondents.'- During the Relevant
Period, the SEC obtained admissions in 44 matters'°l that were brought
99.

The SEC's fiscal year runs from October 1st to September 3 oth of the following calendar

year. Fiscal 2014, for example, runs from October 1, 2013, to September 30, 2014.
§ 986.15 (2016).

7

C.F.R.

See supraTable 1.
This number exaggerates the actual total because on a few occasions the SEC brought
separate actions against several persons connected to the same underlying misconduct.
Specifically, during the Relevant Period, the SEC brought an action against three ConvergEx
subsidiaries. See G-Trade Servs. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71,128, 107 SEC Docket 5418,
5418 (Dec. 18, 2013). On the same day, the SEC brought separate actions againstJonathan
Daspin and Thomas Lekargeren for their roles in the ConvergEx fraud. See Lekargeren,
Exchange Act Release No. 71,127, Investment Company Act Release No. 3o,839, 1 17 SEC Docket
1oo.
1O.

5414, 5415-16 (Dec. 18, 2013); Daspin, Exchange Act Release No. 71,126, Investment Company

Act Release No. 3o,838, 117 SEC Docket 5409, 5410 (Dec. 18, 2013). In 2015, the SEC brought

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:l113

during the Relevant Period or for which an SEC Order was entered during
the Relevant Period, - from 64 defendants and respondents. Thus, using
"total matters brought" as the basis for comparison, the SEC obtained

admissions in 1.81% of the matters it brought during the Relevant Period,
from 1.25% of the overall defendants and respondents it sued during the
Relevant Period.
It might be argued, however, that the proper denominator should be a
subset of the total matters brought, because the overall number includes
delinquent filings cases and follow-on administrative proceedings, both of
which are summary proceedings that might not lend themselves to
admissions. Follow-on administrative proceedings are typically brought to bar
individuals from association with various registered entities, such as brokerdealers, investment advisers and others,103 or to bar individuals from
appearing or practicing before the Commission."'4 The proceedings are
summary in that the predicate is simply the entry of an anti-fraud injunction
or cease-and-desist order against the individual in an underlying SEC
enforcement action, or a criminal conviction against the individual relating
to certain securities law violations, or in some cases the entry of an order in a
matter brought by another regulatory agency.'°5 Follow-on administrative
6
proceedings can be litigated, but they are subject to summary disposition,o
and the only thing that needs to be established is the fact of the predicate
order or conviction. The vast majority of follow-on orders are resolved without

another separate action against Craig Lax for his role in that case. Lax, Exchange Release No.
74,582, 201 5 WL 1324391, at *1 (Mar. 11, 2015). The SEC treats these four actions as separate
matters, although they are clearly linked. The SEC also brought two separate actions with respect
to the Falcone/Harbinger matter (one of which produced a settlement during the Relevant
Period), although again they are clearly linked, and indeed were later consolidated.
102.
During the Relevant Period, the SEC also (s) obtained admissions in a settlement with
Sidney M. Field in connection with the SEC v. Medical CapitalHoldings matter which was filed in
2oo9, Final Judgment as to Defendant Sidney M. Field, SEC v. Medical Capital Holdings, No.
o9-CV-818 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016), outside the Relevant Period; (2) obtained admissions in a
settlement with Sage Advisory Group in connection with the SEC v. Grantmatter that was filed in
201 1, Grant, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4100, 2015 WL 3452970 (June 1, 2015),
outside the Relevant Period (the matter SEC v. Grant is included in the numbers because of a
follow-on AP as to Benjamin Lee Grant (also included in the numbers) but the Sage settlement
is not included); and (3) reached a settlement with State Street Bank and Trust which included
admissions, but the Order containing the admissions was issued on December 12, 2016, State
Street Bank & Trust Co., Investment Company Act Release No. 32,390, 2016 WL 7210099 (Dec.
2016), outside the Relevant Period.
103.
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780- 4 (b) ( 4 ) (2012); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 8ob- 3 (f) (2012).
12,

104.
105.

so6.

SeeRules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2016).

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o- 4 (b)( 4 ).
SeeRules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2 5 0(b).
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a hearing,°7 and are typically considered "pro forma proceedings.' ,o 8
Delinquent filings cases are matters brought to revoke the registration of
companies that fail to make required filings with the Commission.l°9
Typically, the reason companies fail to make required filings is because they
are defunct or no longer operational, or simply lack the funds necessary to
make the required filing.'- ° For the same reason, the companies do not
usually contest the delisting action; indeed, a large number of delinquent
filing orders are entered on default.'
Removing the delinquent filings cases yields the following. During the
Relevant Period, the SEC brought a total of 2,o63 non-delinquent filing
matters against a total of 3,817 defendants and respondents.,1 Using the
same admissions numbers as above, the SEC obtained admissions in 2.13% of
non-delinquent filings cases it brought during the Relevant Period, from
1.67% of the non-delinquent filing defendants and respondents it sued
during that period.
Removing the follow-on administrative proceedings, but keeping the
delinquent filings cases, yields the following. During the Relevant Period, the
SEC brought 1,835 matters, excluding follow-on administrative proceedings
(but including delinquent filings), against a total of approximately 4,473
defendants and respondents. 113 Adjusting the admissions numbers to remove
those matters that had been included only because a follow-on administrative
order was entered during the Relevant Period,"14 the SEC obtained
107.

SeeGideon Mark, SEC and CFTC AdministrativeProceedings, 19J. CONST. L. 45, 56 (2016).
1o8.
CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EXAMINING
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT
PROCESSES AND PRACTICES 13 (2015), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/
uploads/2 o5/07/021882_SECReformFINi.pdf.
109.

SeeSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(j) (2012).

SeeVelikonja, supranote 93, at 942-43 (noting that delinquent filers are usually "empty
shells" that "fail to respond to the SEC's order instituting proceedings").
110.

111.
A study found that in 2014, ALJs issued 119 orders delisting public companies; 113 of
these were entered on default. See CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 1 08, at 13.
112.

See infta Table 2.

113.
Id. The numbers for defendants and respondents are an approximation because the
SEC has not broken out the number of respondents as between standalone and follow-on APs.
However, follow-on APs typically have only one respondent, but on a few occasions, have more.
For example, in fiscal 2015 there were 168 follow-on APs with a total of 173 respondents; in fiscal
2016 there were 195 follow-on APs with a total of 195 respondents. See supra Table 1. The number
of follow-on APs for fiscal 2014 was 232. Id. Using the same ratio, we can estimate that the number
of respondents in follow-on APs in fiscal 2014 was approximately 242.
114. There are four matters, involving four respondents, that the SEC brought before the
Relevant Period, but that were previously included in the totals because a follow-on AP was
brought during the Relevant Period: (1) SEC v. Wyly, French, Exchange Act Release No. 72,414,
1O9 SEC Docket 429 (June 17, 2014); Complaint, SECv. Wyly, No. lo-CV-5 76o (S.D.N.YJuly 29,
201o), a case brought in 2010 with an admissions settlement with Michael C. French and follow-

on AP in March 2014; (2) SEC v. Harbinger Capital Partners, Jenson, Exchange Act Release No.
73,294, 2014 WL 4960759 (Oct. 3, 2014); Harbinger Complaint, supra note 96, at 1, a case
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admissions in 40 matters that it brought during the Relevant Period,
excluding follow-on administrative proceedings (but including delinquent
filings), from 6o defendants and respondents."5 Thus, the SEC obtained
admissions in 2.17% of these cases, from approximately 1.34% of the
defendants and respondents in these cases.
Excluding both follow-on administrative proceedings and delinquent
filings cases yields the smallest denominator, and consequently the highest
possible percentages with respect to admissions cases. Focusing on the
number of admissions obtained with respect to new civil matters and
standalone administrative proceedings (and excluding delinquent filings) is
arguably the most accurate measure of how often admissions are required as
a price of settlement because it eliminates summary and often duplicative
proceedings.", 6 It is also based on the number of "new enforcement cases" the
SEC now routinely trumpets when it announces its yearly achievements.,17
During the Relevant Period the SEC brought a total of 1,468 new civil and
standalone administrative proceedings (excluding delinquent filings), with a
total of approximately 3,199 defendants and respondents." 8 Using the same
numbers for admissions, as in the paragraph above, during the Relevant
Period the SEC obtained admissions with respect to 2.72% of the new civil
and standalone administrative proceedings (excluding delinquent filings) it
brought during the Relevant Period, and with respect to approximately 1.87 %

brought in 2012 with an admissions settlement with PeterJenson and follow-on AP inJuly 2014;
(3) SEC v. Heinz, Heinz, Exchange Act Release No. 72,209, io8 SEC Docket 4243 (May 21,
2014); Complaint, SEC v. Heinz, No. 13-CV-oo753 (D. Utah Apr. 28, 2014), a case brought in
August 2013 with admissions settlement with Steven B. Heinz and follow-on AP in April 2014;
and (4) SECv. Grant, Grant, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4100, 2015 WL 3 4 5 29 70 (June
1, 2015); Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, SEC v. Grant, No. 11-1 15 3 8-GAO (D. Mass.
2013), a case brought in 2011 with admissions settlement with Benjamin Lee Grant and follow-

on AP injune

2015.

115. See infa Table 2.
It should be noted, however, that the SEC has obtained admissions in connection with
1 16.
follow-on administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Pensley, Exchange Act Release No. 79,202, 115
SEC Docket 7 (Oct. 31, 2016) (acknowledging that conduct violated the law, although those
admissions are duplicative of admissions obtained in the settlement of the underlying action that
the follow-on proceeding is based on); Jenson, Exchange Act Release No. 73,294, 2014 WL
4960759, at *3-4 (Oct. 3, 2014) (admitting facts set forth in Annex to Order and acknowledging
that conduct violated the law).
The SEC now breaks out enforcement numbers by separately reporting the number of
117.
new civil matters and administrative proceedings (excluding delinquent filings), follow-on
administrative proceedings, and delinquent filings. See, e.g., Press Release, Enforcement Results
FY 2o 16, supranote 11. The SEC began reporting enforcement numbers this way after the agency
was taken to task for artificially inflating the reported numbers by including routine matters. See
Joshua Gallu, SEC Boosts Tally of Enforcement Successes with Routine Actions, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 22,
2013, 4:oo AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-22/sec-boosts-tally-ofenforcement-successes-with-routine-actions.
118. See infra Table 2.
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of defendants and respondents it sued during the Relevant Period in those
cases.
Finally, the SEC includes "relief defendants" in its totals for defendants
and respondents. Relief defendants are individuals or entities who have not
been accused of violating the law, but who are being sued because they are
alleged to be in possession of proceeds of the unlawful conduct.,9 The SEC
will sue these persons in order to assert a legal claim to the funds. Because
they are not accused of violating the law, they are, in most cases, unlikely
candidates for admissions."" During fiscal 2o16, the SEC sued a total of
approximately 86 relief defendants.- If the relief defendants are removed
from the total number of defendants and respondents, the percentage of
defendants and respondents making admissions rises marginally. The
admissions numbers are detailed in the table below.

119.
*14

See, e.g.,
SEC v. World Capital Mkt., Inc., 864 F. 3 d 996, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4998, at

(9th Cir. 2017) ("Courts may also exercise their broad equitable powers to order

disgorgement from non-violating third parties who have received proceeds of others' violations
to which the third parties have no legitimate claim. In such circumstances, these non-violating
third parties are referred to as 'relief defendants' or 'nominal defendants."' (citing SEC v.
Colello, 139 F. 3 d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1998)).
120.
The SEC could seek an admission from a settling relief defendant to the effect that the
relief defendant has no lawful claim to the funds, perhaps as part of an effort to establish their
case against the actual violator, although I am unaware of any case where the SEC has done so.
The SEC, however, is not above suing relief defendants under questionable circumstances,
perhaps to bolster their case-in-chief. See David Rosenfeld, PhilMickelson and the SEC's Legal Bogey,
WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2016, 9:52 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/phil-mickelson-and-thesecs-legal-bogey-1 466029762.
121.
This number is based on a review of all litigation releases during fiscal 2016. Of course,
the number of relief defendants can vary considerably from year to year. SeeVelikonja, supra note
93, at 947. But in fiscal 2014, the total was 71, see id. at 947 n.249, so the total for the Relevant
Period is very likely to be under 250.

IOWA LAWREVIEW

Table

2.

[Vol. 103:113

Admissions in SEC Enforcement Actions FY 2014-2o16

All Matters
Except
Delinquent
Filings

All Matters
Except
Follow-on
APs

New Civil
Actions &
Standalone
APs
(Excluding
Del. fit.)

2430

2063

1835

1468

Cases

44

44

40

40

Percent

1.81%

2.13%

2.17%

2.72%

Total D&R

5091

3817

4473

3199

Admissions
D&R

64

64

6o

6o

Percent

1.25%

1.67%

1.34%

1.87%

Matt

Total Cases

Admissions

Another useful means of assessing how frequently (or infrequently)
admissions are obtained is to compare the number of settled actions that
include admissions to the overall number of settled actions filed in a given time
frame (as opposed to the total number of actions filed, litigated and settled).
This provides a direct point of comparison and is indicative of how often the
SEC makes an admission the price of a settlement. Looking at the numbers
for fiscal 2016 is illustrative of several points. First, despite the new admissions
policy, the SEC continues to settle, rather than litigate, a large majority of its
cases. That is, a large majority of the cases the SEC brings are filed as settled
rather than contested actions. During fiscal 2016, the SEC brought a total of
868 actions.'- Of these, 526 were settled actions, and 332 were contested
actions.12 3 Another ten cases were hybrids, with some parties settling and
others litigating.124 The numbers are even starker when delinquent filing
cases are removed, because almost all delinquent filings cases are brought as
contested actions, even though they are rarely contested in fact. In fiscal 2o16,
there were 125 delinquent filings cases, 1 16 of which were contested, while

See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
123.
The numbers are taken from SELECT SEC DATA 2o16, supra note 87. To determine
whether cases were settled or litigated I looked to the relevant litigation releases.
122.

124.

Id.
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nine were settled.125 Removing the delinquent filings cases (and omitting the
ten hybrid cases), the SEC brought 517 settled actions and 216 contested
actions during fiscal 2016. During fiscal 2016, the SEC obtained admissions
in connection with 12 matters brought in that time frame. 1 26 Thus, it obtained
admissions in 2.32% of the settled actions filed in fiscal 2016, while 97.67%
of settled actions were done on a no-admit/no-deny basis.
In addition, during fiscal 2016, the SEC sued a total of 1,7oo defendants

and respondents (including those in the ten hybrid cases). Leaving out relief
defendants, there were 706 settling defendants and respondents and 856
litigating defendants and respondents. However, over 40% of those
defendants and respondents were litigating in connection with delinquent
filings cases. When the delinquent filing defendants are removed, there were
696 settling defendants and respondents and 5o litigating defendants and
respondents. During fiscal 2o6, the SEC obtained admissions from 16
defendants and respondents who were charged during that time frame.17
Thus, excluding relief defendants and delinquent filings cases, the SEC
obtained admissions with respect to approximately 2.3% of the defendants
and respondents it settled with. At the same time, 97.7% of the defendants
and respondents who settled with the SEC did so on a no-admit/no-deny basis.
Finally, the SEC does not break out whether defendants and respondents
in its data sets are individuals or entities, but information contained in an SEC
press release announcing Chair White's departure (the "White Release") gives
a rough approximation and also provides another window into the admissions
numbers. The White Release singled out the new admissions policy as a
signature achievement of Chair White's tenure at the agency and observed, as
of that date, that "the Commission ha[d] required admissions from more than
70 defendants, including 44 entities and 29 individuals."129
The White Release also pointed out that during Chair White's tenure-a
period that exceeds by a couple of months the time the admissions policy was
2s

125.

Id.

126.
During fiscal 2016, the SEC also obtained admissions in connection with four matters
that were filed in prior fiscal years. See generally SEC v. Tropikgadget FZE., 146 F. Supp. 3 d 270
(D. Mass. 2015); Final Judgment as to Defendant Sidney M. Field, supra note 1o2; SEC v.
Spongetech Delivery Systems, No. 10-CV-20 3 1 (DLI) (RML) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016); Consent

to Entry of FinalJudgment, SECv. Mata, No. 5 :15 -cv-o1 7 9 2-VAP-KK (C.D. Cal.June 16, 2016).
127.
See infta Appendix.
128. Press Release, White Departure, supranote 13.
129.
Id. The chart in Appendix, infra, lists 29 individual defendants and 47 entities (rather
than 44), during that time frame. The discrepancy is likely due to the fact that three entities
(Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated; Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing
Corporation; and Credit Suisse Group AG) each settled two matters with admissions during that
time frame. The SEC likely counted them only once when compiling their totals (as I did, see
supra text accompanying note 91), both with respect to the number of entities that settled with
admissions and the total number of entities that were subject to an enforcement action during
Chair White's tenure.
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in effectl3°-the agency brought enforcement actions against more than
2,700 individuals and 3,300 companies.l3' This means that admissions were
obtained with respect to approximately 1.074% of individual defendants and
respondents, and approximately 1.33% of entity defendants and respondents
during this time period (through November 14, 2016).
The admissions numbers are similarly small when compared to the
overall number of enforcement "actions" filed during this time frame, as
reported in the White Release. As of November 14, 2o16, the SEC had
obtained admissions in connection with some 50 enforcement "actions" (the
number is lower than the number of defendants who made admissions in
settlements because several enforcement actions had more than one settling
defendant).32 According to the White Release, "during Chair White's tenure
the [agency] brought more than 2,85o enforcement actions."'33 This means
that the SEC obtained admissions with respect to one or more individuals or
entities in connection with roughly 1.75% of the enforcement "actions" that
it brought during this time period (through November 14, 2016).
2.

The Charges
i.

Fraud

When the SEC adopted the new admissions policy, then-Chair White
stated that cases potentially requiring admissions included "[c]ases where a
large number of investors have been harmed or the conduct was otherwise
egregious" and "[c]ases where the conduct posed a significant risk to the
market or investors."'s4 It stands to reason that the most egregious cases would
be the ones where admissions are necessary for proper accountability and to
promote public trust. As it turns out, however, since the new policy was first
announced, many of the most egregious cases-typically those involving some
kind of fraudulent conduct-have continued to be settled on a no-admit/nodeny basis. While the number of fraud cases where admissions were obtained
is a substantial portion of the total admissions cases, overall the number of
admissions cases involving fraud is fairly small, and the number involving
scienter-based fraud-presumably the most egregious kind-is smaller still.'35
130.
Chair White was sworn in on April 10, 2013, and the new policy on admissions was
publicly announced on June 18, 2013, so there is a nine-week disparity. Eaglesham & Ackerman,
supra note 7; Press Release, SEC, Mary Jo White Sworn in as Chair of SEC (Apr. lo, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2o' 3-2o 13 - 5 6htm.
131. Press Release, White Departure, supra note 13. The numbers do not line up perfectly:
in a few cases (e.g., Falcone/Harbinger) the case was filed before Chair White's tenure, although
the settlement and the admissions were obtained during her tenure. See, e.g., Falcone Complaint,
supranote 96; Harbinger Complaint, supra note 96.
132.

See infra Appendix.

133. Press Release, White Departure, supra note 13.
134. White, supra note 3.
See infra Part III.B.2.a.i-ii.
135.
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There are numerous anti-fraud provisions under the federal securities
laws, and the state of mind required to show a violation differs, not only
between the various provisions, but also within particular provisions. Some
violations require a showing of scienter, which has been defined as "a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."3 6 Recklessness
meets the scienter requirement, although courts differ on the degree of
recklessness required.137 Other violations are non-scienter based, meaning
that a showing of intentionality or recklessness is not required: Negligence is
sufficient. Anti-fraud provisions that are scienter-based include section 1o (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") and rule 1ob- 5
thereunder;,38 section 17(a) (1) of the Securities Act of 193 3 ("Securities
Act");'39 section 15(c) (1) of the Exchange Act;14o and section 2o6(1) of the

Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act") .'4, Anti-fraud provisions that
are non-scienter based include sections 17(a) (2) and (3) of the Securities
Act;142 section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and rule 14a-9 thereunder;43
sections 2o6(2)144 and 2o6(4) of the Advisers Act;'4s and section 3 4 (b) of
6
Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Company Act").4
To properly analyze the data, it is best to separate out entities and
individuals.

136. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
137. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 3o8, 319 n.3 (2007) ("Every
Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter
requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though the Circuits
differ on the degree of recklessness required." (citing Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc.,
353 F. 3 d 338, 343 (4 th Cir. 2003))).
138. Ernst &Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197-212.
139. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 68o, 695-96 (198o).
140.
See SEC v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc., 678 F. 3 d 1233, 1244 (1 ith Cir. 2012) ("The
elements of a § 15(c)(1) claim are the same as a § it(b) claim."); SECv. George, 426 F. 3 d 786,
792 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The elements ofa § 15(c ) (1) violation are the same as those for a violation
of the anti-fraud provisions described above, with a similar scienter requirement.
).
141.
See SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
142. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697.
143. SEC v. Das, 723 F. 3 d 943, 953-54 (8th Cir. 2013); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether scienter is
required under section 14(a). Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 109O n.5 (1991);
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 n.7 (1976).
144. SeeSEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 18o, 195 (1963).
145. Steadman, 967 F.2d at 647.
146. See id. at 643 n.5 (applying a negligence standard with respect to section 3 4 (b) of the
Company Act); Blair, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4695, Investment Company Act
Release No. 32,621, 2017 WL 162924o, at *1, *8 (May 1, 2017) ("Proof of scienteris not required
to establish a violation of Section 3 4 (b) of the Investment Company Act.").
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Entities

From inception through February 15, 2017, 22 entities have made some
kind of admission147 in cases involving some kind of fraud charge. (At the time
of the White Release, 19 of the 44 referenced entities (or about 40%) made
admissions in fraud cases.) Of the 22, 12 entities have made admissions in
cases involving scienter-based fraud:
(i) Three entities have made admissions in cases involving

violations of section lo(b) of the Exchange Act, and rule
iob-5 thereunder. 148

(2)

Three entities made admissions in cases involving violations
of section io(b) of the Exchange Act (and rule iob-5
thereunder), and section 17 (a) (i) of the Securities Act. '49

(3) One entity made admissions in a case involving violations of
section io(b) of the Exchange Act (and rule iob-5
thereunder), section 17(a) (1) of the Securities Act, and
section 2o6(1) of the Advisers Act.150

(4) Two entities made admissions in a case involving violations
of sections io(b) and 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, and
rule iob-5 thereunder.'5'

147.
As discussed below, the form of admissions is not consistent: in some cases, there are
admissions of facts only; in other cases, there have been admissions of fact and also an admission
that the conduct violated the law. See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
See Muehler, Exchange Act Release No. 78,1 18, 201 6 WL 4363425, at *s (June 21,
148.
2016) (obtaining admissions from Alternative Securities Markets Group Corp. and Blue Coast
Securities Corp.); G-Trade Servs. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71,128, 107 SEC Docket 5418,
5418 (Dec. 18, 2013) (obtaining admissions from Convergex Global Markets Limited).
See Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction as to Defendants Aquaphex Total Water
149.
Solutions, LLC & Gregory Jones at 1, SEC v. Aquaphex Total Water Sols., LLC, 1 5-CV-00 4 38
(N.D. Tex. June 10, 2015) [hereinafter Final Judgment Aquaphex] (obtaining admission from
Aquaphex Total Water Solutions); Final ConsentJudgment as to Defendants Philip A. Falcone;
Harbinger Capital Partners LLC; Harbinger Capital Partners Offshore Manager, L.L.C.;
& Harbinger Capital Partners Special Situations GP, L.L.C. at 2, SEC v. Falcone, No. s 2-CV-5027
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Final ConsentJudgment Falcone] (obtaining admissions
from Harbinger Capital Partners Offshore Manager, L.L.C. and Harbinger Capital Partners
Special Situations GP, L.L.C).
See Final Consent Judgment as to Defendants Philip A. Falcone; Harbinger Capital
150.
Partners LLC; Harbinger Capital Partners Offshore Manager, L.L.C.; & Harbinger Capital
Partners Special Situations GP, L.L.C. at 3, SEC v. Harbinger Capital Partners LLC, i2-CV- 5 028
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Final Consent Judgment Harbinger] (obtaining
admissions from Harbinger Capital Partners LLC).
151.
See G-TradeServs.LLC, 107 SEC Docket at 5418-s9 (obtaining admissions from G-Trade
Services LLC and Convergex Execution Solutions LLC).
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(5) One entity made admissions in a case involving violations of
section 17 (a) (1) of the Securities Act. 52
(6) Two entities made admissions in cases involving violations
of section 2o6 (1) of the Advisers Act.'53
The other ten entities made admissions in cases involving non-scienterbased charges: Seven entities made admissions in cases involving violations of
sections 17(a) (2) and/or 17(a) (3) of the Securities Act;154 one entity made
admissions in a case involving violations of sections 2 o6 (2) and 2 o6 (4) of the

Advisers Act;,55 one entity made admissions in a case involving violations of
section 2o6(4) of the Advisers Act;5 6 and one entity made admissions in a
case involving violations of section 3 4 (b) of the Company Act.'57
While the number of entities that have made admissions in scienter-based
fraud cases is small to start with, it is still something of an exaggeration
because several of these entities were related and the admissions were part of
a single settlement: Three of the entities were Harbinger-related entities
involved in the same misconduct;15s three were related entities involved in the

152.
See Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs., Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange Act
Release No. 74,104, 1 1O SEC Docket 3793, 3793 (Jan. 21, 2015) (obtaining admissions from
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services).
153.
SeeGrant, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4100, 2015 WL 3452970 (May 27, 2015 )
(obtaining admissions from Sage Advisory Group, LLC); F-Squared Investments, Inc., Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3988, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,393, 11O SEC Docket
2953, 2953 (Dec. 22, 2014) (obtaining admissions from F-Squared Investments, Inc.).
154.
See Orthofix Int'l, N.V., Securities Act Release No. 10,281, Exchange Act Release No.
79,815, 2017 WL 192377 (Jan. 18, 2017) (obtaining admissions from Orthofix International,
N.V.); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Securities Act Release No. 9992, Exchange Act Release No.
76,694, 2015 WL 9256635 (Dec. 18, 2015) (obtaining admissions from bothJPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. andJ.P. Morgan Securities LLC); Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., Securities Act Release No.
10,272, Exchange Act Release No. 79,576, 2016 WL 7324405 (Dec. 16, 2o16) (obtaining
admissions from Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.); Credit Suisse AG, Securities Act Release No.
10,299, Exchange Act Release No. 79,044, 2016 WL 5800369 (Oct. 5, 2o16) (obtaining
admissions from Credit Suisse AG); ITG Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9887, Exchange Act
Release No. 75,672, 2015 WL 4748216 (Aug. 12, 2015) (obtaining admissions from ITG Inc.
and Alternet Securities, Inc.); Barclays Capital Inc., Securities Act Release No. lOoo, Exchange
Act Release No. 77,001, 2016 WL 369813 (Jan. 31, 2016) (obtaining admissions from Barclays
Capital Inc.).
155.
SeeJPMorganChase Bank, N.A., 2o1 5 WL92 5 66 3 5 , at *i (obtaining admissions fromJ.P.
Morgan Securities LLC andJPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.).
156.
See Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4649, 2017 WL
587246, at "1 (Feb. 14, 2017) (obtaining admissions from Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC).
157.
See Bank of N.Y. Mellon, Investment Company Act Release No. 32,151, 2016 WL
3345651, at "i (June 13, 2016) (obtaining admissions from Bank of NewYork Mellon).
158.
See Final Consent Judgment Falcone, supra note 149, at 3 (obtaining admissions from
Harbinger Capital Partners Offshore Manager, L.L.C and Harbinger Capital Partners Special
Situations GP, L.L.C.); Final Consent Judgment Harbinger, supra note 15o, at 3 (obtaining

admissions from Harbinger Capital Partners LLC).
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ConvergEx matter;59 and two were related entities in the Alternative
Securities/Blue Coast matter., 6o (These cases also had individual defendants
or respondents, which will be discussed below.)
When account is taken of the related entities and multiple filings relating
to the same case, it would be more accurate to say that the SEC obtained
admissions with respect to seven matters involving scienter-based fraud, a very
small number overall: (i) Falcone/Harbinger (io(b)); (2) ConvergEx
(io(b)); (3) Alternative Securities/Blue Coast (io(b)); (4) Aquaphex
(io(b)); (5) Standard & Poor's Ratings Services; (6) F-Squared Investments;
and (7) Sage Advisory. Additionally, only four of those matters involved
violations of section i o(b) of the Exchange Act (and rule i ob-5 thereunder),
6
the only one of these anti-fraud provisions that has a private right of action.1 ,
Moreover, two of these cases involved unusual circumstances which may
affect the value of the admissions. The ConvergEx matter involved a
widespread fraudulent scheme to obtain excess undisclosed commissions for
the execution of trading orders., 62 The SEC charged three brokerage
subsidiaries of ConvergEx Group, a global trading services provider, and two
of its former employees, who together paid more than $107 million in
disgorgement and penalties to resolve the matter.163 The respondents also
admitted certain facts, and admitted that their conduct violated the federal
securities laws.164 At the same time, one of the ConvergEx brokerage
159.

See G-Trade Servs. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71,128, 107 SEC Docket 5418,

5419-20 (Dec. 18, 2013) (obtaining admissions from G-Trade Services LLC; Convergex Global

Markets Limited; and Convergex Execution Solutions LLC).
16o.
See Muehler, Exchange Act Release No. 78,118, 2016 WL 4363425, at *1 (June 21,
2016) (obtaining admissions from Alternative Securities Markets Group Corp. and Blue Coast
Securities Corp.).
161. The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed whether there is a private right of
action under section 17 (a) of the Securities Act. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 304 n.9 (1985) ("We express no view as to whether a private right of action
exists under §17(a)."). However, almost all circuits have now held that there is no private right
of action under that section. SeeMaldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F. 3 d 1, 6-8 (1 st Cir. 1998); Finkel
v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1992); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines &Jonas,
913 F.2d 817, 819-20 (soth Cir. 199o), abrogated on other grounds by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S.
549 (2000); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 ( 7 th Cir. 199o); Currie v. Cayman Res. Corp., 835
F.2d 780, 784-85 (1 1th Cir. 1988); Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1107 ( 4 th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); In reWash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1350-58 ( 9 th Cir. 1987);
Corwin v. Marney, Orton Invs., 788 F.2d 1063, 1o66 ( 5 th Cir. 1986); DeviNes v. Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir. 1986). There is no private right of action under section
2o6 of the Advisers Act. See Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-25
(1979). There is also no private right of action under section 34 of the Company Act. See Bellikoff
v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F. 3 d 11o, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2007).
162. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges ConvergEx Subsidiaries with Fraud for Deceiving
Customers About Commissions (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/20 13-266.
163. See id.
164. See G-Trade Servs. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71,128, 2013 WL 6665240, at *1
(Dec. 18, 2013) (obtaining admission from G-Trade Services LLC); Lekargeren, Exchange Act
Release No. 71,127, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,839, 117 SEC Docket 5414, 5415
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subsidiaries and the two individuals pled guilty to parallel criminal charges
involving the same conduct.,65 The admissions, therefore, were largely
66
duplicative of the criminal pleas.
The Sage Advisory case is also a bit of an oddity: The SEC filed two cases
in federal district court against Sage and its principal Benjamin Grant, about
a year apart. The first case went to trial, and the SEC prevailed. 67After that
68
case was decided, Sage and Grant settled the second case, with admissions.'
The admissions, in other words, only came after ajury finding of liability.
Finally, the cases involving scienter-based fraud have very rarely involved
large, well-known entities. Indeed, only one of those cases, an action against
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services which involved violations of section
17 (a) (1) of the Securities Act,169 involved what might be termed a household
name in the financial services industry.
In fact, Harbinger stands out as the only admissions case against what
might be termed a big financial player where there were allegations of section
io(b) fraud and no parallel criminal charges. I use the word "allegations"
here because even in that case there may be less than meets the eye when it
comes to the actual admissions. The case against Philip Falcone and the
Harbinger entities was the first case the SEC settled in which admissions were
obtained. When the SEC filed the case in 2012, the complaints (there were
two filings) alleged that the conduct at issue violated, among other things,
section io(b) of the Exchange Act, section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and
section 2o6(1) of the Advisers Act (different parties were charged with
different violations).170 Among other things, the SEC sought as relief the entry

(Dec. 18, 2013); Daspin, Exchange Act Release No. 71,126, Investment Company Act Release
No. 30,838, 117 SEC Docket 5409, 5410 (Dec. 18, 2013).
165. Press Release, Dep't of'Justice, Convergex Group Subsidiary and Two Employees Plead Guilty
to Securities and Wire Fraud Charges (Dec. 18, 2013), https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/convergexgroup-subsidiary-and-two-employees-pead-guity-securities-and-wire-fraudcharges.
166. The admissions in the ConvergEx case could therefore have been obtained under the

older policy of departing from no-admit/no-deny where there is a parallel criminal plea. See Lewis

D. Lowenfels & Michael J. Sullivan, SEC Policy Change Re Settlements with Admissions of Wrongdoing,
68 SMU L. REV. 795, 8o6 (2015).
167.
See SEC, Court Orders Massachusetts Investment Adviser to Pay Over $i Million to Conclude
Two SEC Fraud Cases, Litigation Release. No. 23,273 (June 1, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2015/lr23273.htm.
168.
See id.
169. See Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs., Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange Act
Release No. 74,104, 1 1O SEC Docket 3793 (Jan. 21, 2015). It should be noted that Standard
& Poor's made only very limited admissions of fact in that case, and did not acknowledge that its
conduct violated the federal securities laws. Id. at 3793. It should also be noted that the SEC
issued three separate orders at the same time against Standard & Poor's for related misconduct;
only the order referenced above contained any sort of factual admissions, while the other two
orders were entered on a no-admit/no-deny basis. See id.; Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs.,
Exchange Act Release No. 74,103, 11 o SEC Docket 3854, 3854 (Jan. 21, 2015).
17o . Falcone Complaint, supranote 96, at 5-6; Harbinger Complaint, supranote 96, at 2-3.
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of an injunction against future violations of those provisions.'7' When the case
was settled, however, the consent judgment recited the charges and alleged
violations, but the judgment did not include the entry of an injunction against
future violations of those provisions.'72 The end result was that Falcone and
the Harbinger entities admitted to a set of facts, and admitted that they acted
recklessly, but not that their conduct violated the law;'73 there was no actual
finding of any sort by the court that the defendants actually violated anti-fraud
provisions.'74

The other fraud admissions cases involving big institutional players
(JPMorgan Chase, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, and Morgan
Stanley Smith Barney) have all involved non-scienter-based fraud charges
under sections 17(a)(2) and (3)of the Securities Act or sections 2o6(2) or
2o6 (4) of the Advisers Act. 175
b.

Individuals

With respect to individuals, the number of admissions cases involving
scienter-based fraud is considerably higher: 17 of the 30 individuals made
admissions in cases where the charges included violations of section i o(b) of
the Exchange Act, and half of those individuals were also charged with
violations of section 17 (a) of the Securities Act.'76 A few were charged with

171.
Falcone Complaint, supra note 96, at 26; Harbinger Complaint, supra note 96, at 27.
172. Final Consent Judgment Falcone, supra note 149, at 13; Final Consent Judgment
Harbinger, supra note 15o, at 13.
173. Oddly, Peter Jenson, who was Harbinger's COO, acknowledged in his settlement that
his conduct violated the federal securities laws. See Final Consent Judgment as to Defendant Peter
A. Jenson at 2, No. 12-CV- 5 028 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014). This is difficult to explain, given that
'Jenson (was] only an aider and abettor while Falcone [was] the prime mover and prime
wrongdoer.... ." Lowenfels & Sullivan, supra note 166, at 8o3.
174. Compare this to the other fraud cases where there was an admission not only of the
facts, but of a violation of law, and either a finding (if an administrative proceeding) that the antifraud provisions had been violated, see Muehler, Exchange Act Release No. 78,1 18, 2016 WL
4363425, at *6 (June 21, 2016); G-Trade Servs. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71,128, 107 SEC
Docket 5418, 5424 (Dec. 18, 2013), or (if a federal court action) the entry of an injunction
against future violations of the anti-fraud provisions (which is necessarily predicated on there
having been a violation of those provisions), see Final Judgment Aquaphex, supranote 149, at 2.
175. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4649, 2017
WL 587246, at "1 (Feb. 14, 2017); Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10,272,
Exchange Act Release No. 79,576, 2016 WL 7324405, at *4 (Dec. 16, 2016). Credit Suisse AG
made two admissions. Credit Suisse AG, Securities Act Release No. 10,299, Exchange Act Release
No. 79,044, 2016 WL 5800369, at *11-12 (Oct. 5, 2016); Barclays Capital Inc., Securities Act
Release No. io,oio, Exchange ActRelease No. 77,001, 2016WL 369813, at *1o (Jan. 31, 2016);
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Securities Act Release No. 9992, Exchange Act Release No. 76,694,
201 5 WL 9 25 66 3 5 , at *9(Dec. 18, 2015).
176. Philip Falcone;Jonathan Samuel Daspin; Thomas Lekargeren; Craig S. Lax; Michael C.
French; Steven B. Heinz; Michael A. Horowitz; Rayla Melchor Santos; Chih Hsuan "Kiki" Lin;
Katsuichi Fusamae; Gregory G. Jones; Steven C. Watson; Sidney M. Field; Steve Pappas; Steven J.
Muehler; Paul Mata; and Joel Pensley. See infra Appendix.
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violations of section 206(1) of the Advisers Act, either in conjunction with
those charges or independently.'77
Two things, however, are worthy of note with respect to individual
admissions and the kinds of cases in which they occur. First, in several
instances the individuals who made admissions in settlements with the SEC

also pled guilty to criminal charges connected to the misconduct, either

before or contemporaneously with the SEC settlement. Indeed, in one insider
trading case the SEC filed its complaint along with a consent judgment
containing admissions only after the defendant had already pled guilty to
criminal charges involving the same illegal activity.17 In the ConvergEx
matter discussed above, two individuals made admissions in settling the SEC

matter while simultaneously pleading guilty to criminal charges.,79 Several

other individuals who made admissions in SEC settlements also pled guilty to
some criminal charge. so Requiring admissions in cases where the defendant
has pled guilty to criminal charges may resolve the obvious tension that exists
when a defendant pleads guilty to criminal charges and then is allowed to
settle with the SEC on a no-admit/no-deny basis, but optics aside, the
admissions add nothing in those cases because the defendant would typically
have already allocuted to the same facts as part of the plea.
Second, in the vast majority of cases where an entity admitted to
wrongdoing in settling a case, there were no individuals charged. This is true
even though the SEC has been severely criticized for failing to charge
individuals in significant cases, particularly those involving major financial
institutions, and even though Chair White specifically stated when she
announced the admissions policy that going forward the SEC would seek to
8
hold individuals accountable.',
This has not proven to be the case: In only six matters where entities
made admissions were there also individuals who made admissions, and only
five of those cases involved fraud charges. s2 More to the point, only the
177. Steven B. Heinz; Sean C. Cooper, Reid S. Johnson; andJohn W. Rafal. See infra Appendix.
178. SEC, SEC ChargesMan with Insider Trading on Acquisition of Cooper Tire, Litigation Release
No. 23,4o8 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2o1 5 /lr2 3 4 o8.htm.
179. See supranotes 162-66 and accompanying text.
i8o. See, e.g., Consent Order, USA v.John Rafal, No. 1:17-CR-looo4 (D. Mass.Jan. 20, 2017)
(obstruction); Plea Agreement for Defendant Chih Hsuan Lin, USA v. Chih Hsuan Lin, No.
15 -CR-oo 4 75 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2o16) (Chih Hsuan "Kiki" Lin pled guilty to wire fraud);
Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, USA v. Heinz, No. 14 -CR-oo 4 48 (D. Utah
Sept. 25, 2014) (receiving stolen money and fraud).
181.
See White, supra note 3 ("Another core principle of any strong enforcement program is
to pursue responsible individuals wherever possible.... Companies, after all, act through their
people. And when we can identify those people, settling only with the company may not be
sufficient. Redress for wrongdoing must never be seen as 'a cost of doing business' made good by
cutting a corporate check.").
182.
See Muehler, Exchange Act Release No. 78,118, 2016 WL 4363425, at *1 (June 21,

2016); Final ConsentJudgment Falcone, supra note 149, at 1; Final Judgment Aquaphex, supra
note 149, at 1; Grant, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4100, 2015 WL 3452970 (May 27,
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Harbinger/Falcone case and the ConvergEx case involved entities that
plausibly could be described as big players, and in the case of ConvergEx two
of the individuals pled guilty to parallel criminal charges. Otherwise, the cases
against major players in the financial services industry that have resulted in
admissions have rarely involved charges against individuals,'83 and in at least
one case where an individual was also charged, the SEC allowed the individual
to settle on a no-admit/no-deny basis.'5 4 There have been only a few cases
involving admissions by large financial institutions where the SEC also
litigated an action against a responsible individual.' 8 5
ii.

Non-FraudCharges

The non-fraud charges with respect to entities in admissions cases have
been a real mixture, including charges of FCPA violations,' 86 various books
and records provisions,'5 7 broker-dealer rules,' 8 violations of the securities
registration provisions,'5 9 and a smattering of more technical regulatory

2015) (obtaining admissions from Sage Advisory Group, LLC); G-Trade Servs. LLC, Exchange

Act Release No. 71,128, 107 SEC Docket 5418, 5419-20 (Dec. 18, 2013). The sixth case was
Hous. Am. Energy Corp., Securities Act Release No. 9757, 2015 WL 1843840 (Apr. 23, 2015).
183.
See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4 64 9,
2017 WL 587246, at *1 (Feb. 14, 2017) (entity made admissions in settlement; no individuals
charged); Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10,272, Exchange Act Release No.
79,576, 2016 WL 7324405, at *4 (Dec. 16, 2o16) (same); Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., Exchange
Act Release No. 79,113, 2016 WL 6o81797, at *3 (Oct. 18, 2016) (same); Citigroup Glob. Mkts.,
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,291, 2016 WL 436382o, at *2 (July 12, 2016) (same); Barclays
Capital Inc., Securities Act Release No. io,oio, Exchange Act Release No. 77,001, 2o16 WL
369813, at *4 (Jan. 31, 2016) (same); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Securities Act Release No.
9992, Exchange Act Release No. 76,694, 2015 WL 9256635, at * 1 (Dec. 18, 2015) (same); Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 75992 (Sept. 28, 2015) (same); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,083, 2015 WL 3452968 (June
1, 2015) (same); Bank of Am. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 72,888, lo9 SEC Docket 3294,
3295 (Aug. 21, 2014) (same); Scottrade, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 71,435, lo8 SEC Docket
571, 571 (Jan. 29, 2014) (same).
184. See Credit Suisse AG, Securities Act Release No. 10,299, Exchange Act Release No.
79,044, 2016 WL 5800369, at * 1 (Oct. 5, 2o16) (entity made admissions in settlement; individual
charged with causing entity's violation settled on a no-admit/no-deny basis).
185. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,141,
2016 WL 4363431, at *3 (June 23, 2016) (individual charged in litigated AP); Standard & Poor's
Ratings Servs., Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange Act Release No. 74,104, 11o SEC
Docket 3793, 3794 (Jan. 21, 2015) (individual charged in litigated AP);JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 70,458, 107 SEC Docket 877 (Sept. 19, 2013) (two individuals
charged in litigated civil proceeding).
186. See Orthofix Int'l, N.V., Securities Act Release No. 10,281, Exchange Act Release No.
79,815, 2017 WL 192377, at *14 (Jan. 18, 2017).
187. SeeJPMorgan Chase & Co., 107 SEC Docket 877.
188. See Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 9711, Exchange Act Release
No. 74,141, 1 lo SEC Docket 3957, 3957 (Jan. 27, 2015).
189. SeeEthiopian Elec. Power, Securities Act Release No. 10,093, 2o16 WL 3181326, at *1,
*3 (June 8, 2016).
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violations.,9o There is no discernable pattern that would indicate which types
of violations the SEC considers to be particularly egregious, or why some of
these particular cases warranted an admission. Some of these cases are
undoubtedly important for the message that they send to the public
concerning the conduct and the entity involved. But others seem to offer little
in the way of a compelling narrative. For example, the SEC seems particularly
concerned with obtaining admissions from large financial institutions that fail
to provide the SEC with accurate information about the trades they execute,
known as Blue Sheet Data.,9,
With respect to individuals, the non-fraud charges in admissions cases
have mostly been related to violations of the registration provisions of the
Securities Act (section 5).
However, this may be a distortion: Seven
individuals made admissions with respect to violations of section 5 in
connection with a single case, SEC v. TropikgadgetFZE,which was described as
a pyramid scheme targeting Latino communities.93 This was undoubtedly a
case that deserved to be publicized and where factual admissions might be
very helpful to investors, both as a basis for recovering money and for
evaluating the company and the quality of its investment product. It is,
however, only one case and hardly suggestive of a trend.
3.

Classification of Cases

With respect to the types of cases where admissions have been obtained,
by far the largest number involves broker-dealers (23) followed by investment
advisers/investment companies (1o).194 This suggests that the SEC is
primarily interested in obtaining admissions with respect to registered
persons, i.e., financial services companies and professionals that must be
licensed in order to do business. These are also the areas where the SEC has
the greatest leverage in obtaining admissions: Entities that want to remain

o

19 .

See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,083, 2015

WL 34 5 29 68, at *2 (June 1, 2015) (rule 2o 3 (b) of Regulation SHO).
191.
See Scottrade, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 71,435, io8 SEC Docket 571, 571 (Jan.
29, 2014); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 75,992, 2015 WL 5 67 5 10 4 ,
at *1 (Sept. 28, 2015); Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,291, 2o16 WL
436382o, at *4 (July 12, 2016).
192.
See, e.g., Consent of Defendant Chih Hsuan "Kiki" Lin and Relief Defendant USA Trade
Group Inc., SEC v. CKBi68 Holdings LTD, No. 13 -CV-5 5 84 (E.D.N.Y.July 10, 2015).
193. See SEC v. Tropikgadget FZE, No. 15 -CV-1o 5 4 3 , 2017 BL 56815 (D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2017);
SEC, SEC Obtains Final Judgment Against Massachusetts-Based Promoter of Pyramid Scheme
Targeting Latino Communities, Litigation Release No. 23548 (May 27, 2016), https://www.
sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2o16/lr23548.htm; SEC, SEC Obtains Final Judgments Against
Promoters of Pyramid Scheme Targeting Latino Communities, Litigation Release No. 23647 (Sept.
19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/itigation/litreleases/2016/lr2 3 64 7.htm.
194. I am using the primary classifications used by the SEC in its data sets. As the SEC notes,
however, many cases could fit into several different classifications. For those cases filed in fiscal
2017, 1 have used the most likely case designation.
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licensed, or that need relief from "bad boy" provisions'95 that would kick in if
there was a finding of scienter-based fraud, often have little choice but to
accede to the SEC's demands. For example, entities that are repeat offenders,
like many of the large financial institutions that are repeatedly sanctioned by
the SEC, might fear that if they don't make the requested admissions, the
agency might actually get serious and pull their license.9 6 Similarly, entities
that are concerned with obtaining waivers and other relief from "bad boy"
provisions might be willing to make admissions in exchange for non-scienterbased fraud charges. Individual violators in the securities industry are
routinely barred from association when they commit serious offenses;
however, they typically have a right to reapply after a certain amount of time,
and may view admissions as a form of cooperation, the absence of which would
color their chances of gaining readmission to the industry.
Other categories of cases where the SEC has obtained admissions include
issuer reporting and disclosure (io) and securities offerings (6), both core
areas of concern for the SEC, and also areas that are tightly regulated.'97 On
the other hand, admissions have almost never been obtained in insidertrading cases (only once to date).,98
4.

Form of the Admissions

The admissions at issue here have taken several forms. In some instances,
the defendant or respondent has only admitted to certain facts, which are
typically outlined in an appendix to the administrative order,99 or consent
judgment.2c Sometimes, the respondent has admitted to certain findings20l
or facts contained in the actual order. In other cases, there have been not only
admissions of facts, but also an acknowledgment that the conduct at issue

195.

On "bad boy" provisions, see infta notes 2 14-19 and accompanying text.
Some financial services companies have repeatedly violated the securities laws and have
repeatedly been sanctioned by the SEC. Indeed, a few of the entities that have made admissions
to date have already done so on more than one occasion. See, e.g., supra note 94 and
196.

accompanying text (discussing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated and Merrill
Lynch Professional Clearing Corporation). While those sanctions have often included significant

financial penalties, those penalties are typically viewed as a cost of doing business and little else.
While these entities have also been enjoined, or ordered to cease and desist, from future
violations of certain provisions of the federal securities laws, there is apparently no consequence
for violating the injunction or cease-and-desist order.

197.

See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Monsanto Paying $8o Million Penalty for Accounting

Violations (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2o6-2 5 .html ("Financial

reporting and disclosure cases continue to be a high priority for the Commission."). See generally
SEC, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
198.
See SEC v.Watson, No. 15-CV-1 3 868, 2015 WL 7273218 (D.Mass. Nov. 17, 2015).
199. See, e.g.,JPMorgan Chase& Co., Exchange Act Release No.70,458,107 SEC Docket 877
(Sept. 19, 2013).
200.
See, e.g.,
Final ConsentJudgment Falcone, supra note 149.
201.
See, e.g.,
Scottrade Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 71,435, 2014 WL 316 7 4 3 (Jan.

29, 2014).
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violated the federal securities laws.202 Once again, there does not appear to be
any discernable pattern to these admissions, or any explanation why some
defendants and respondents have been allowed to settle with just an
admission of facts while others have also had to admit that their conduct
violated the law.2°3 One might suspect that it is merely a matter of successful
bargaining by the lawyers, perhaps on threat of litigating the matter if the SEC
insists upon the more fulsome admission. To the extent that there is an
emerging trend, most of the recent cases-all involving the entry of
administrative cease-and-desist orders-have taken the form of an admission
of facts detailed in specified sections of the order, along with an
acknowledgment that the conduct violated the federal securities laws.204 Even
that, however, may be in flux: In the latest case involving admissions, Morgan
Stanley Smith Barney did not "acknowledge[] that its conduct violated" the
federal securities laws, which had been the emerging standard language, but
instead only acknowledged that its conduct violated a specific provision of the
Advisers Act.205 This suggests that the language and form of the admissions is
still very much open to negotiation.
IV.

ASSESSMENT AND CRITIQUE

After more than four years, the SEC has proclaimed the new admissions
policy to be a success. While there are still critics of the policy, the industry
and the defense bar seem to have reconciled themselves to the idea of
occasional admissions, perhaps in recognition that their worst fears have not
come to pass. I would like to suggest here that this is the result of a calculated
strategy of accommodation that has allowed the SEC to publicly tout a
position of tough enforcement and public accountability, while in reality
continuing business as usual. As detailed above, the overall number of
admissions is small in comparison to the number of enforcement actions, and
the vast majority of defendants and respondents who settle matters with the
SEC continue to do so on a no-admit/no-.deny basis. This is not in and of itself
surprising: The SEC stated at the outset that admissions would be the
exception rather than the rule. What is concerning is the lack of any clear
202.
See, e.g., Credit Suisse AG, Securities Act Release No. 10,299, Exchange Act Release No.
79,044, 2016 WL 5800369 (OcL 5, 2016); Bank of Am. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 72,888,
1o9 SEC Docket 3294, 3294 (Aug. 21, 2014).
203.
See Lowenfels & Sullivan, supra note 166, at 8o2-03.
204.
See, e.g., Orthofix Int'l, N.V., Securities Act Release No. 10,281, Exchange Act Release
No. 79,815, 2017 WL 192377, at "i (Jan. 18, 2017); Allergan, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
79,814, 2017 WL 167936, at *1 (Jan. 17, 2017); Rafal, Exchange Act Release No. 79,755,
Investment Company Act Release No. 32,416, 2017 WL 74963, at *i (Jan. 9, 2017); Deutsche

Bank Sec. Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10,272, Exchange Act Release No. 79,576, 2o16 WL
7324405, at *1 (Dec. 16, 2016); Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., Exchange Act Release No. 79,113,

2016WL 6081797, at*l (Oct. 18, 2016).
205.
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4649, 2017

WL

5

872 4 6, at*1 (Feb. 14, 2017).
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pattern that might reveal a rationale to explain and justify the policy. There
has been a remarkable lack of standards, consistency, and transparency in the
application of the admissions policy, which undermines its effectiveness and
value. Moreover, the SEC has seemingly agreed, by and large, to avoid seeking
admissions in cases where there could be real collateral consequences.
Limiting the number of cases where admissions are required and avoiding
collateral damage may be judicious. It may also be a concession to practical
reality: Defendants who are faced with real collateral consequences that could
flow from admissions might refuse to settle on those grounds. Insisting on
admissions in those cases could lead to an increase in litigation and a diversion
of scarce agency resources. Indeed, this was the principal objection raised
when the new policy was adopted. By not going down this road, the SEC may
have chosen the prudent course. But it calls into question the stated purpose
of the policy: to bring a measure of public accountability in the most egregious
cases. It also calls into question whether the SEC is really prepared to go to
6
trial if it does not obtain admissions3
A.

ABSENCE OF THE MOST SEIOUS CHARGES

As discussed above, the SEC has very rarely obtained admissions from
entities in cases involving scienter-based fraud. Taking account of related
entities, the SEC has obtained admissions with respect to only seven matters
involving scienter-based fraud.207 The remaining "fraud" cases against entities
have all involved non-scienter-based charges, i.e., charges that only require a
showing of negligence.2o8 These distinctions are meaningful for several
reasons.
First, scienter-based fraud is probably the most egregious form of
misconduct under the securities laws. The fact that there have been so few
instances where entities have made admissions in those kinds of cases suggests
that the SEC may not in fact be requiring admissions with respect to the most
egregious conduct, or that in settling cases involving what it perceives to be
the most egregious conduct, the SEC is not insisting, for whatever reason, that
the resolution involve the most serious charges.2°9 Another possibility is that
more entities are choosing to litigate when confronted with the necessity of
an admission, but there is no evidence to that effect.

206.

Chair White had stated that her goal was to create a trial-ready agency. SeeWhite, supra

note 14.

See supraPart III.B.2.a.i.
See supraPart III.B.2.a.i.
209.
The disjunction between the conduct alleged and the charges filed was one of the main
concerns expressed by Judge Rakoff in the Citigroup case: The described conduct looked like
scienter-based conduct, yet the SEC was allowing a setflement that involved only negligence based
charges. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330-34 (S.D.N.Y 201 1)
(looks like scienter but only charged with negligence).
207.
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Second, the fraud cases involving violations of sections 17 (a) (2) and (3)
of the Securities Act are distinct for another reason. In addition to the fact
that those charges involve a negligence standard, there is also no private right
of action for violations of section 17(a).so It is noteworthy that in settling

"egregious" cases involving some kind of fraudulent conduct, the SEC has
opted for charges that do not involve the showing of intentionality that is
typically required for a private lawsuit, and has proceeded pursuant to a
statutory provision that does not allow for private actions.211 For those reasons,
Professor Coffee has called an admission of liability in an SEC action under
section 17 "an admission that effectively admits nothing."212
Third, scienter-based fraud liability carries other collateral
consequences. For example, in 2005, the SEC adopted far-reaching changes
to the registration and offering process under the Securities Act.2'3 Among
other things, the SEC adopted less stringent rules applicable to some of the
largest and most widely followed issuers of securities, referred to as "WellKnown Seasoned Issuers" ("WKSIs").214 A WKSI is an issuer that has at least
$700 million in market capitalization, or that has at least $1 billion in debt,
and has timely filed all its periodic reports.2 1 5WKSIs can proceed much more
quickly with public securities offerings because they can register their
offerings on shelf registration statements that become effective automatically
upon filing-rather than having to wait for the SEC to declare the registration
statement effective before making sales-and can make unrestricted written
and oral offers prior to filing a registration statement.2, 6 As a result, qualifying
as a WKSI can be very beneficial for an issuer of securities.
In order to forestall abuse, the new rules included "bad boy" provisions
that, among other things, excluded issuers that had been convicted of certain
crimes, or that had violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
21o.
It is possible that the conduct admitted to in those cases could constitute a violation of
other provisions of the securities laws. There are private rights of action that are based on negligence
(and even strict liability) in cases involving fraud in connection with securities offerings (see sections
1 1 and 12 (a) (2) of the Securities Act), but it does not appear that those types of violations were at
issue in the settled admissions cases. There have been a few admissions cases involving violations of
section 5 of the Securities Act. SeeSECv. Tropikgadget FZE, 15 -CV-io 5 4 3 , 2017 BL 56815 (D. Mass
Feb. 23, 2017); Ethiopian Elec. Power, Securities Act Release No. 10,093, 2016 WL 3181326, at *3
(June 8, 2016). A violation of section 5 is a predicate for an action under section 12 (a) (1) of the
Securities Act, but that is not an anti-fraud provision.
211.
Of course, as the Second Circuit made clear in the Citigroup case, it is not the SEC'sjob to
make it easier for private litigants to prevail. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 752 F.3 d 285, 297 (2d Cir.
2014) ("[T]he district court [cannot] reject a consent decree on the ground that it fails to provide
collateral estoppel assistance to private litigants--that simply is not the job of the courts.").

212.
Coffee, supra note 75.
213.
See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release
No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 85 SEC Docket 2871 (Aug. 3, 2005).
214.

Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2o16).

215.

Id.

216.

Id.
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laws. Specifically, an issuer that in the past three years "was made the subject
of anyjudicial or administrative decree or order arising out of a governmental
action that:" (1) enjoined the issuer from violating the anti-fraud provisions;
(2) ordered the issuer to "cease and desist from violating the anti-fraud
provisions"; or (3) "determines that the [issuer] violated the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws," is deemed to be an "ineligible issuer"
21
that cannot qualify for WKSI status. 7
However, the rules also provide that the SEC can grant a waiver of
ineligible issuer status "upon a showing of good cause." The Commission has
delegated authority to grant waivers to its Division of Corporation Finance in
most instances. In determining whether good cause exists, the Division looks,
among other things, to "whether the conduct involved a criminal conviction
or scienter-based violation, as opposed to a civil or administrative nonscienter-based violation. " 2' s The issuer's burden of showing that good cause

exists for a waiver is "significantly greater" in cases involving a scienter-based
violation.219 To date, most of the big financial entities that have settled cases
involving fraud charges with admissions have received WKSI waivers, either
from the Division or from the Commission itself.220 The one exception
involved JPMorgan Chase, and that was likely due to a very public airing of
the rather uncomfortable fact that the company had already obtained no
fewer than six WK.SI waivers relating to other misconduct!-' Although the
Id.
SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., Revised Statement on Well-Known Seasoned Issuer Waivers (Apr. 24,
2014) [hereinafter SEC, Revised Statement], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/wksiwaivers-interp-o3121 4 .htm; see SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin., Statement on Well-Known Seasoned Issuer
Waivers (July 8, 2o1), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guldance/wksi-waivers-interp.htrn.
219.
SEC, Revised Statement, supranote 218.
See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, Securities Act Release No. 10,273, 2016 WL
220.
7324406 (Dec. 16, 2016) (Order under rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933, granting a waiver from
being an ineligible issuer); Barclays PLC, Securities Act Release No. 10,012, 2016 WL 369807, at *2
(Jan. 3, 2016) (Order under rule 405 of the Securities Act of 1933, granting a waiver from being an
ineligible issuer); Letter from Tim Hensler, Chief, Office of Enft Liaison, SEC, to Elaine C. Greenberg,
Greenberg Tranrig, LLP (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2o17/
morgan-stanley-o2141 7-4 o5 .pdf; Letter from Tim Henseler, Chief, Office of Enf't Liaison, SEC, to Paul
R. Eckert, WilmerHale (June 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2o16/
bank-new-york-mellon-corporation-o613 1 6-405.pdf.
The JPMorgan settlement occurred at a time when the policy of granting WKSI waivers was
221.
under considerable public scrutiny. In May of 2015, the Commission issued an Order granting a WKSI
waiver toJPMorgan Chase & Co. SeeJPMorgan Chase & Co., Securities Act Release No. 9780, 2015 WL
2395509 (May 20, 2015). Commissioner Kara Stein dissented, issuing a statement in which she
criticized the routine granting of such relief, noting that this was the sixth WKSI waiver thatJPMorgan
Chase had obtained since 2o08. See Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, SEC, Dissenting Statement Regarding
Certain Waivers Granted by the Commission for Certain Entities Pleading Guilty to Criminal Charges
Involving Manipulation of Foreign Exchange Rates (May 21, 2015), https://www.sec.
gov/news/statement/stein-waivers-granted-dissenting-statement~html. The waiver practice had also
been publicly criticized by Senator Elizabeth Warren. See Ed Beeson, Warren Blasts SEC,DOJ Over 'Slap
on the Wrist' Enforcement, 1AW36o (Apr. 15, 2015, 7:07 PM), https://www.law36o.com/articles/
643593/warren-blasts-sec-doj-over-slap-on-the-wrist-enforcement; Kevin McCoy, Warren Seeks Public
217.

218.

2017]

ADMISSIONS IN SEC ENFORCEMENT CASES

practice of routinely, and sometimes repeatedly, granting WKSI waivers has
been severely criticized, the agency has generally allowed large financial
institutions to avail themselves of the fast-track regardless of their violations.222
Other provisions of the federal securities laws contain "bad boy"
provisions that disqualify persons who have engaged in specified violative
conduct. For example, rule 5o6 of Regulation D under the Securities Act of
1933 exempts certain offers and sales of securities from the registration
provisions of the Securities Act, so long as the issuer meets certain specified
conditions.223 The rule, however, disqualifies "bad actor" issuers. Among

other things, an issuer that, within the last five years, has been the subject of
a Commission cease-and-desist order involving scienter-based fraud is deemed
a bad actor and cannot avail themselves of the exemption.224
The rule also disqualifies an issuer who in the last five years has been
subject of a court order enjoining it from engaging in any conduct in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security,25 or who is subject to a
Commission order that places limits on the activities and functions of brokerdealers or investment advisers.22 6 But the rule also allows the Commission to

waive such disqualification "[u]pon a showing of good cause . . . if the

Commission determines that it is not necessary under the circumstances that

an exemption be denied."227 On at least one occasion, the Commission has

waived the 5o6 "bad actor" disqualification in a case involving admissions,

Hearingon Bank Waivers, USA TODAY (May 25, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/2 015/05/ 25/elizabeth-warren-criticizes-bank-waivers/27911773. When JPMorgan agreed to
settle another case in December 2015, by paying $267 million in disgorgement and penalties (the
admissions case), another WKSI waiver was probablyjust too much for the agency to swallow. SeeAnma
Viswanatha & Emily Glazer, SEC Takes Tougher Stance on Enforcement injP.Morgan Case WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 27, 2015, 8:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-takes-tougher-stance-on-enforcementinj-p-morgan-case-1445986962.
222.
In addition to JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America also lost its WKSI status. In August
2014, Bank of America agreed to a global settlement with various agencies relating to certain
mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities. As part of the global settlement, Bank of
America agreed to pay more than $245 million to resolve two separate SEC matters. See Press
Release, SEC, Bank of America Admits Disclosure Failures to Settle SEC Charges (July 26, 2016)
[hereinafter Press Release, Bank of America], https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-172.
One of the two SEC matters, involving books and records violations, was settled with admissions; the
other settlement, which involved more serious fraud charges, did not include admissions. ConparefBank
of Am. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 72,888, lo9 SEC Docket 3294, 3295 (Aug. 21, 2014) with
Final Judgment as to Bank of America at 1, SEC v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 13 -CV-4 4 7 (W.D.N.C. Nov.
25, 2014). In connection with these settlements, a deeply divided Commission refused to grant Bank
of America a WKSI waiver. See PeterJ. Henning, With Bank ofAmeica Order,S.E.C. Breaks the Mold, N.Y.
TIMEs: DEALBOOK (Dec. 8, 2014, 12:4 7 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/o8/with-bankof-america-order-s-e-c-breaks-the-mold. The denial of the WKSI waiver was clearly based on the fraud
charges; the books and records violations involved in the admissions would not have been disqualifying.
223.
See rule 5o6 of Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.5o6 (2016).
224. See id. § 230.5 o6(d) (1) (v) (A).
225. See id. § 2 3 0. 5 o6(d) (1) (ii) (A).
226. See id.
§ 230.5o6(d) (i)(iv) (B).
227.

See id. § 2 3 0. 5 o6(d) (2) (ii).
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where the predicate was the entry of an order limiting the activities of a
broker-dealer.22s

The dearth of scienter-based fraud charges with respect to entities seems
specifically designed to avoid the kinds of collateral consequences that the
defense bar most feared when the admissions policy was first announced.
Indeed, there is one recent and particularly telling example of the SEC
bending over backwards to avoid collateral consequences in settling with an
entity: In July 2o16, State Street Bank and Trust agreed to settle an SEC
enforcement action and admit certain findings, but the SEC agreed that the
order (which would contain the admissions) would only issue "after a federal
court approves State Street's proposed settlement with private plaintiffs in
pending securities class action lawsuits" 229 This may be a sensible (and
creative) means of dealing with a legitimate concern, but it undermines the
idea that admissions will be required in "egregious" cases, and calls into
question the principle of public accountability that ostensibly informed the
admissions policy.
Overall, the absence of the most serious charges-scienter-based fraudin admissions cases has mitigated the main concern voiced by the industry
and the defense bar: By and large, entities that have made admissions when
settling SEC enforcement actions have only rarely suffered any collateral
consequences, either in the form of private litigation, °0or some form of "bad
boy" ineligibility. The lack of collateral consequences may be viewed as a
positive thing: If there were serious collateral consequences, the SEC might
not be able to obtain admissions in settlements, and might be forced to litigate
certain actions which could eat up scarce agency resources. But there is a
sense as well that the SEC is acting opportunistically by dropping the most
serious charges in exchange for an admission. It also raises the question
whether public accountability is better served by a settlement that includes an
admission to a negligence charge (that may not reflect the actual seriousness
of the misconduct), or a no-admit/no-deny settlement that includes a more
serious (and more appropriate) scienter-based charge. Either the SEC is not
requiring admissions in the most egregious cases, or it is allowing the most
egregious cases to settle with an admission to a lesser charge. Either scenario
undermines the value and purpose of requiring public admissions in
settlements.

228.

See Barclays Capital Inc., Securities Act Release No. 1o,o 1, 2o16 WL 369806, at * 1 (Jan.

31, 2016).

SeePress Release, SEC, State Street Misled Custody Clients About Prices for Foreign Currency
229.
Exchange Trades (July 26, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2oi6-1 5 2.html. The
Order was eventually entered on December 12, 2016. See infta Appendix.
On the very limited collateral impact of admissions in SEC enforcement actions on
230.
private securities litigation, see Siegel, supra note 61, at 455-61.
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B. LACK OF CLEAR STANDARDS
Another problem that has plagued the admissions policy is a lack of clear
standards governing when, and under what circumstances, the SEC will
require admissions. Chair White provided a non-exclusive list of "potential
candidates" that included: cases where a large number of investors have been
harmed or the conduct was otherwise egregious; cases where the conduct
posed a significant risk to the market or investors; cases where admissions
would aid investors deciding whether to deal with a particular party in the
future; and cases where reciting unambiguous facts would send an important
message to the market about a particular case. 23, But these descriptions are
bare bones boilerplate, largely devoid of substantive guidance. They are so
general and amorphous that arguably they could apply to almost any case the
SEC brings.23 A survey of the cases where admissions have been obtained to

date does little to clarify matters.
To be sure, there have been cases that would seem to fit neatly into one
of the described categories. These include several cases where the conduct
was obviously egregious, where large numbers of investors were harmed, or
where the conduct posed a significant risk to markets and investors. For
example, in a case connected to massive losses caused by the so-called
"London Whale," the SEC obtained admissions from JPMorgan Chase for
misstating financial results and lacking effective internal controls to detect
and prevent its traders from fraudulently overvaluing investments to conceal
hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses. JPMorgan paid the SEC a
$200 million penalty that could be distributed to harmed investors as part of
a global settlement with other regulators that totaled $920 million.233
But there are other cases that are hard to place in any of the described
categories. For example, in July 2015, the agency settled a matter with two
respondents: a stock promoter named Kevin McKnight, and his entity,
Undiscovered Equities. Both were charged with failing to disclose the amount
of compensation they had received to promote a certain stock.234 The fact that
they had received compensation was disclosed, but the actual amount was
not.2 35 As part of the settlement, both respondents admitted certain facts and

231. White, supra note 3; see also Ceresney, supra note 51 ("This could include matters
involving a large number of harmed investors, where the conduct presented a significant risk to
the market, where admissions would safeguard the investing public from risks posed by
defendants, and where a recitation of unambiguous facts is important to send a message to the
market about a particular case.").
232.
SeeLowenfels & Sullivan, supra note s66, at 798 ("The articulated criteria can be applied
to almost any enforcement proceeding initiated by the Commission.").
233. SeeJPMorgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 70,458, 107 SEC Docket 877, 888
(Sept. 19, 2013).
234. See Hous. Am. Energy Corp., Securities Act Release No. 9757, 2015 WL 1843840, at *1
(Apr. 23, 2015).

235.

Id. at *1-2.
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consented to the entry of an order finding that they had violated section
17 (b) of the Securities Act.23 6 McKnight was also ordered to pay a civil penalty
of $22,5o0 and agreed not to receive compensation for promoting stocks for
a period of five years.2 37 Undoubtedly, failing to disclose the amount of
compensation received in connection with stock promotion activities is a clear
violation of the law. But it is hard to argue that the conduct here was
.egregious," that "large numbers of investors" were harmed thereby, that the
"conduct posed a significant risk to markets and investors," or any of the other
listed factors. This is amply reflected not only by the charge, but by the
amount of the fine. Again, while this was clearly unlawful conduct, in the
grand scheme of SEC enforcement actions it seems rather trivial, and hardly
a candidate for admissions under the announced standards. The case is even
more baffling in that the misconduct at issue was connected to a larger
scheme that involved far more egregious misconduct and did result in large
investor losses. Yet-as more fully discussed in the section below-the
perpetrators of that far more egregious scheme were allowed to settle the
charges (which included scienter-based fraud charges) on the same day as
McKnight on a no-admit/no-deny basis.238
Or take the case of Reid Johnson. Johnson ran an investment advisory
firm and was charged with making false statements in some registration forms
filed by the advisory firm, as well as with aiding and abetting and causing his
firm's violations of certain rules relating to the custody of client funds.239 As
part of the settlement, Johnson admitted to the factual findings in the order
and that his conduct violated the federal securities laws.24o He was ordered to
cease and desist from committing or causing any violations or future violations
of sections 2o6(4) and 207 of the Advisers Act, and he was barred from
association with any broker-dealer or investment adviser with a right to apply
for readmission after one year, provided he completed 30 days of compliance
training.24, He was also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $45,ooo.24 Bad
conduct? No doubt. Deserving of the punishment he received? Again, no
doubt. But egregious conduct? Conduct that harmed a large number of
investors, or created risk to the markets? Not by a long shot. Perhaps sadly,
Reid Johnson is a run-of-the-mill case in the pantheon of SEC enforcement,
of which there are probably dozens of examples every year. The comparatively
small scale of the violations is again reflected in the charges, the penalty, and
236.

Id. at *2.

237.

Id.

238.

See Hous. Am. Energy Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 74,800, 2015 WL 1843838, at

*1 (Apr. 23, 2015).

239.
SeeJohnson, Exchange Act Release No. 77,625, Investment Company Act Release No.
32,073, 2016 WL 1461419, at * (Apr. 14, 2o16).
240.
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the other remedial sanctions that were ordered, all of which were relatively
light compared to other cases. Why this one qualified as one of those
exceptional situations where admissions were required is anybody's guess.
C.

LACK OFCONSISTENCY

In addition to lacking clear standards as to when admissions are required,
and closely connected thereto, there has been a remarkable and troubling
lack of consistency in the application of the admissions policy. While many of
the cases where admissions were obtained fit squarely within the stated
parameters of the policy, there are many other cases that would seem to easily
fall within the four corners of the policy where settlements proceeded on a
no-admit/no-deny basis. Similar cases have been treated differently, and even
within the same case there have been inconsistent applications, with certain
defendants or respondents making admissions while others are allowed to
settle on a no-admit/no-deny basis. When then-Chair White announced the
policy, she insisted that the determination of when admissions would be
required should be solely a matter of agency discretion, but a review of the
cases reveals a certain amount of arbitrariness in the process.
1. Lack of Consistency Between Similar Cases
One way to gauge a lack of consistency-and a lack of clear standardsis to compare the admissions cases to the list of significant enforcement
actions contained in SEC annual reports. Every year, the SEC puts out an
annual report which contains, among other things, a description of significant
enforcement matters that it brought during the previous fiscal year. A look at
the 2016 annual report ("the Report")-the latest year for which data is
available and the time frame that reflects the admissions policy at its most
mature stage-reveals some unusual and surprising points.243

Of the many "significant" matters highlighted in the Report, six were
matters where admissions were obtained.244 The first case described in the

243.

See generally SEC, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016 (Nov. 14, 2016)

[hereinafter 2o16 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT], https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2o16.pdf#
chairmessage. It's worth noting thatjust over half of the admissions cases that were filed and resolved
in 2016 (6 out of 11), were referenced in the significant matters sections of the annual report. Id.
at 155. To be sure, that section does not purport to be comprehensive or to be a listing of all the
significant matters: it says that the "section highlights some of the significant enforcement cases filed
or instituted by the SEC in FY 2016." Id. (emphasis added). Nonetheless, it does suggest that some
of the admissions cases were viewed as less significant, at least than those that were singled out. The
six that were singled out in the report are: Barclays; Merrill Lynch; Citigroup; Grant Thornton;

JPMorgan Chase; and Ethiopian Electric Power. Id. at 155-58. The five that were not are: Marwood;
Steve Muehler (Alternative/Blue Coast); Bank of NY Mellon; Steve Pappas; and Reid Johnson. Id.

In addition, there were several other matters that were resolved with admissions during fiscal 2016,
but were filed or instituted in previous years; none of those settlements were highlighted in the
report. Id.
244.

Id. at 155-58.
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report involved Merrill Lynch, and it's easy to see both why it was highlighted
as significant and why the case was a good candidate for admissions.245 Merrill
Lynch admitted that it failed to adequately safeguard customer securities and
misused customer cash to generate profits for the firm over a period of several
years.46 To resolve the matter, Merrill Lynch agreed to disgorge $57 million
in illicit profits, pay a $358 million civil penalty and admit that its conduct
violated the securities laws.247 The case fit squarely within the stated

parameters for when admissions might be required: The conduct was
egregious and it posed a significant risk to investors. The size of the penalty
reflected the seriousness of the wrongdoing and was one of the largest
financial payments made in an SEC case that year.24 8
The second case highlighted in the report, however, starkly reveals the
inconsistent application of the admissions policy. The report describes two
matters, one involving Barclays the other involving Credit Suisse, that
concerned violations of the federal securities laws in the operation of
alternative trading systems ("ATS") and what are known as "dark pools."249 In

the report the two matters are treated together-as indeed they were in the
press release announcing the settlements-almost as though they were a
single case.2 5° And it's easy to see why: The matters involved very similar forms
of misconduct in the same industry space; both entities were charged with
violations of section 17(a) (2) of the Securities Act (although each entity was
also charged with other differing violations); and both entities made very
similar financial payments to resolve the matters: Credit Suisse paid a
$30 million penalty and disgorged $24.3 million in profits and interest to the
SEC, and separately paid another $30 million penalty to the Attorney General
of New York, for total payments of $84.3 million; Barclays paid a $35 million
penalty to the SEC, and another $35 million penalty to the Attorney General
of New York, for total payments of $70 million.5, There was only one
significant difference: As part of the settlement, Barclays was required to make
admissions of fact and to acknowledge that its conduct violated the federal
securities laws, whereas Credit Suisse was allowed to settle the matter on a noadmit/no-deny basis.252

245.

Id. at 155.

246. Id. ats6.

247. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,141, 2016
WL 4 3 63 43 1,at *22 (June 23, 2016).
248. Press Release, Enforcement Results FY 2o16, supra note 11.
249. 2o16 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 16.
250.
Press Release, SEC, Barclays, Credit Suisse Charged with Dark Pool Violations: Firms
Collectively Paying More Than $150 Million to Settle Cases (Jan. 31, 2016) [hereinafter Press
Release, Barclays], https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2o 16-i6.html.
251.

Id.

252.
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It is very difficult, if not impossible, to see why the Barclays and Credit
Suisse matters were treated differently. The slightly higher penalty that
Barclays paid may be indicative of slightly more egregious conduct, although
the difference is marginal at best. At the same time, Credit Suisse's
disgorgement of illicit profits suggests that its actions caused greater investor
harm, a factor that should weigh in favor of requiring admissions. It's true
that there were some differences in the provisions that were violated: Barclays,
for example, was charged with violations of section 15 (c) (3) of the Exchange
Act and rules 15c3-5 (c) (1) (i) and 15c3-5 (b) thereunder (provisions that deal
with custody of client funds), and Credit Suisse was not.2 53 But section

15 (c) (3) is not scienter-based, and both entities were charged with violations
of section 17(a) (2) of the Securities Act (which is non-scienter-based
fraud).254 It's hard to see why a violation of section 15 (c) (3) would make the
difference (and to the extent that it does, it makes it hard to distinguish the
Merrill Lynch case discussed below). In any event, Credit Suisse was also
charged with violating various regulatory provisions that Barclays was not
charged with.255 In the end, facts can always be distinguished, and the relevant

conduct may be subject to slightly different regulatory provisions, but from a
big picture perspective it's hard to reconcile the different treatment of these
two entities with respect to the misconduct at issue. There may ultimately be
a reason, but if so, the SEC has failed to explain it, which itself undermines
the value of requiring admissions, as more fully discussed below.
The next "significant" case highlighted in the Report involved Merrill
Lynch (a different case than the Merrill Lynch case discussed above involving
the payment of $415 million in disgorgement and penalties), and this one
did not involve admissions, although it certainly could have been a
candidate.256 The case involved Merrill's failure to implement effective
controls to prevent erroneous orders from being sent to the market, a failure
that led to a series of mini-flash crashes which caused certain stock prices to
plummet and then suddenly recover within seconds.57 The charge was a
violation of section 15(c) (3) of the Exchange Act (one of the statutory
provisions that Barclays violated, although it was a different rule under that
provision).258 The then-Director of Enforcement said in a press release that
"[m] ini-flash crashes, such as those caused by Merrill Lynch, can undermine

investor confidence in the markets,"59 and Merrill Lynch paid a hefty
$12 .5 million penalty to resolve the matter, a penalty that was touted in the
253.

Id.

254.

Id.

255.

Id.

2016 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 16.
257. Press Release, SEC, Merrill Lynch Charged with Trading Controls Failures That Led to
Mini-Flash Crashes (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2o16-192.html.
258.
Id.
259.
Id.

256.
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Report as "the largest ever assessed" in a case involving violations of the SEC's
market access rule.26 o As reflected in the SEC's statements and the penalty
imposed, the conduct in this case could certainly be described as "pos[ing] a
significant risk to the market or investors,"'2 6 , one of the factors the agency

said it would consider in determining whether to require admissions. Yet
6
Merrill Lynch settled the matter on a no-admit/no-deny basis.2 2
Other significant cases highlighted in the Report reflect similar
inconsistencies. For example, only two matters are described in the section of
the Report highlighting significant "gatekeeper" cases, one involving Grant
Thornton, the other Ernst &Young.263 Both firms were found to have engaged

in improper professional conduct pursuant to section 4 C(b) of the Exchange
Act and rule 102 (e) (1) (iv) of the SEC's Rules of Practice.264 Both firms were
also found to have caused issuers to violate section 13 (a) of the Exchange Act
and rule I 3a-1. Grant Thornton was accused of "ignor [ing] red flags and fraud
risks while conducting deficient audits of two publicly traded companies" and
6
paid disgorgement of approximately $1.5 million and a $3 million penalty.2 5
Ernst & Young was accused of violating auditor-independence rules by
allowing close personal relationships between senior auditors and senior
management at audit clients, and paid over $9.3 million in monetary
sanctions. 2 66 Despite the fact that the SEC singled out these two cases as
significant gatekeeper actions, and despite the similar charges and substantial
monetary sanctions, Grant Thornton was required to admit facts and
acknowledge that its conduct violated the federal securities laws as part of the
settlement, whereas Ernst & Young was allowed to settle on a no-admit/nodeny basis.267 There may well be reasons to treat these cases differently, but
they are not apparent on the surface. To make matters worse, there isn't even
any internal consistency: While Grant Thornton admitted certain facts and
acknowledged that its conduct violated the federal securities laws, the two
engagement partners who committed the misconduct at issue were allowed to

260.

2o16 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 16.

261.

Id.

262.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,929, 2o16
WL 5 3 5 811 4 , at*s (Sept. 26, 2016).
263.
2016 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 17.
264. See Ernst & Young LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 78,872, 2o16 WL 4983301, at *1
(Sept. 19, 2016); Grant Thornton, LLP, Exchange Act Release 76,536, 2015 WL 7755463, at "s
(Dec. 2, 2015).
265. Press Release, SEC, Grant Thornton Ignored Red Flags in Audits (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2o 1 5 -272.html.
266. Press Release, SEC, Ernst & Young, Former Partners Charged with Violating Auditor
Independence Rules (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-s87.html.
267.
Compare Grant Thornton, LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 76,536, 2015 WL 7755463,
at *1 (Dec. 2, 2015), with Ernst & Young LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 78,872, 2016 WL
4983301, at *1 (Sept. 19, 2o16), and Ernst & Young LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 78,873,
2016 WL 4 9 83 3 02, at * (Sept. 19, 2o16).
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settle the charges against them at the same time on a no-admit/no-deny

basis.2611

Similarly, in the section of the Report on "Investment Advisers and
Companies," the SEC singled out three noteworthy enforcement actions
during fiscal 2016. One involved charges againstJPMorgan Chase for failing
to disclose conflicts of interest with clients. JPMorgan settled the matter by
paying $267 million in disgorgement, interest, and penalties.269 JPMorgan

also admitted certain facts and acknowledged that its conduct violated the
federal securities laws.27o The JPMorgan case clearly involved egregious
conduct, as reflected by the size of the monetary payments, and failure to
disclose conflicts of interest with clients is undoubtedly the kind of conduct
that puts investors at risk. But the other two cases singled out by the SEC in
the Report also involved conduct that was similarly egregious and put
investors at risk. One of the cases involved four private equity fund advisers
affiliated with Apollo Global Management who agreed to pay $52.7 million in
disgorgement, interest, and penalties-described in the SEC Report as "the
largest monetary sanctions ever assessed against a private equity firm"-to
settle charges that they had misled fund investors about fees the advisers
collected.27' The other case also involved conflicts of interest and improper
fee disclosure: Three private equity fund advisers in The Blackstone Group
agreed to pay $39 million to resolve charges that they failed to fully inform
investors about benefits the advisers obtained from various fees and
discounts.272 Yet the Apollo and Blackstone matters both settled on a noadmit/no-deny basis.
The section at the front of the Report on accounting fraud highlights two
"notable" actions during fiscal 2016, one involving Weatherford
International, the other the Monsanto Company. These were clearly
important cases, involving egregious conduct and high risk to investors and
the markets, in an area that the SEC has repeatedly singled out as being
fundamental to the health of the securities markets and a high priority for
SEC enforcement.73 Weatherford, for example, was accused of inflating

268.
269.

SeeKoeppel, Exchange Act Release No. 76,537,2015WL7755467, at* i (Dec. 2, 2015).
2016 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 18.

270.

Id. at 18; seealso Press Release, SECJ.P. Morgan to Pay $267 Million for Disclosure Failures

(Dec. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Press Release, J.P. Morgan], https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/
201 5 -28

3

.html.

2016 SEC FINANcIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 17; see also Press Release, SEC, Apollo
Charged with Disclosure and Supervisory Failures (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/
271.

pressrelease/201 6-i6 5 .html.
272.
2016 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 17; see also Press Release, SEC,
Blackstone Charged with Disclosure Failures: Private Equity Advisers to Pay Nearly $39 Million
Settlement (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-235.html.
273.
See 2016 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 17 ("Comprehensive, accurate, and
reliable financial reporting is the bedrock upon which our markets are based. Because of this,
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earnings by using deceptive income tax accounting.74 The conduct was
prolonged, spanning from 2007 to 2012, and resulted in the issuance of false
financial statements that inflated Weatherford's earnings by over
$9oo million.275 As a result of the misconduct, Weatherford was forced to
restate its earnings on three separate occasions. 276 The impact on investors
was considerable: "After announcing the First Restatement, Weatherford's
stock price declined nearly i '% in one trading day ($2.38 per share), closing
at $21.14 per share on March 2, 2o11. The decline eliminated over
$1.7 billion from Weatherford's market capitalization."277 The seriousness of
the misconduct was reflected in the charges, which included scienter-based
fraud (section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act and section lo(b) of the
Exchange Act), and the size of the penalty imposed ($140 million) .27s Yet the

company and the two individuals charged in connection with the misconduct
settled the matter on a no-admit/no-deny basis.279

In the other highlighted case, Monsanto agreed to pay an $8o million
penalty to resolve charges that it violated accounting rules and misstated
company earnings as pertaining to one of its principal products.28o The
conduct here was arguably less egregious than in the Weatherford case (the
charges included non-scienter-based fraud), but it was clearly viewed as an
important message case for the SEC: Not only was the case highlighted in the
Report, but the press release announcing the matter included a quote by the
SEC Chair, which is highly unusual in enforcement actions.'28 Yet despite the
seriousness of the misconduct and the evident need to publicize it, the
company and the individuals responsible were all allowed to settle the charges
on a no-admit/no-deny basis.s2

rooting out financial and disclosure fraud thus must be a priority for Enforcement-and FY 2o16
was no exception.").
274. SeeWeatherford Int'l PLC, Securities Act Release No. 10,221, Exchange Act Release No.
78,944, 2016 WL 5 3 9 0 5 11, at *1 (Sept. 27, 2016).
275.

Id.

276. Id.
277.
Id. at *2.
278.

Id. at*3, *22.

279.

Id. at "i.

28o.
See Monsanto Co., Securities Act Release No. 10,037, Exchange Act Release No. 77,o87,
2016 WL 537943, at *19 (Feb.9, 2016).

281.

Press Release, SEC, Monsanto Paying $8o Million Penalty for Accounting Violations

(Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-25.html ("'Financial reporting

and disclosure cases continue to be a high priority for the Commission and these charges show
that corporations must be truthful in their earnings releases to investors and have sufficient
internal accounting controls in place to prevent misleading statements,' said SEC Chair MaryJo
White. 'This type of conduct, which fails to recognize expenses associated with rebates for a
flagship product in the period in which they occurred, is the latest page from a well-worn
playbook of accounting misstatements.'").
282. Monsanto Co., 2016 WL 5 3 79 4 3, at*1-2.
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The significant cases involving complex financial instruments
highlighted in the Report also reflect a lack of consistency. For example, the
Report groups together "charges against UBS AG, Merrill Lynch, and UBS
Financial Services involving misstatements and omissions by issuers of
structured notes, a complex financial product."2s3 However, the case against
Merrill Lynch included admissions, while the cases against UBS AG and UBS
Financial Services were settled on a no-admit/no-deny basis.284 It is true that
the Merrill Lynch case-which we have already discussed (it is highlighted in
several sections of the Report)-involved truly egregious conduct and
included payments of $415 million in disgorgement and penalties.85 But the
two cases against UBS entities were included in the significant case part of the
Report for a reason: They too involved serious misconduct and the payment
of large monetary fines. UBS Financial Services paid more than $15 million
to settle charges that it failed to adequately educate and train its sales force
about important factors concerning the structure and risks of certain complex
financial products that it sold to retail investors.286 That may not seem the
most egregious form of misconduct, except that "UBS sold approximately
$548 million [of these complex products] to more than 8,7oo relatively
inexperienced retail customers.'17 To the extent that risk to investors is a
criterion for requiring admissions, this one would seem to qualify.
The case against UBS AG also involved the sale of complex financial
instruments to large numbers of unsophisticated investors. In this instance,
UBS AG sold approximately $19o million of the notes in question to
approximately 1,9oo U.S. investors.211 UBS was charged with misleading
investors through material misstatements or omissions in the offering
documents for these products, including failing to disclose certain
markups.289 Moreover, there were real investor losses that could be traced to
the misconduct, amounting to some $5.5 million.290 The firm was charged
with violating section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which prohibits
obtaining money or property by means of misstatements and omissions in the
offer or sale of securities.9, To settle the case, UBS agreed to pay more than

See 2016 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 19.
284. See UBS AG, Securities Act Release No. 9961, 2015 WL 5935345, at *1 (Oct. 13, 2015);
UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,958, 2o16 WL 5404891, at * i (Sept. 28, 2016);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,929, 2016 WL
5358114, at *1 (Sept. 26, 2016).
285. See, e.g., 2016 SEC FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 243, at 16.
286. See UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 2016 WL 5404891, at *6-7.
287. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges UBS With Supervisory Failures in Sale of Complex Products
to Retail Investors (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2o16-1 9 7 .hmfl.
288.
See UBSAG, 2015WL 5935345, at*1-2.
289. Id. at *2.
290. Id.
291.
Id.at*5.
283.
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$19.5 million in disgorgement, interest and penalties.292 Judged by the
amount of investor harm, the overall risk to investors, and the need to put the
investing public on notice, the case could easily qualify as one requiring
admissions, yet it was allowed to settle on a no-admit/no-deny basis.293
Since the admissions policy was introduced, there have been many other
curious examples where entities have made admissions in cases that could fit
well within the stated parameters of the admissions policy, while other
companies charged with far more egregious conduct of the exact same sort
have been allowed to resolve matters on a no-admit/no-deny basis. For
example, the SEC recently settled a case with a medical device company called
Orthofix over Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") violations. The
company was charged with paying bribes to doctors at government-owned
hospitals in Brazil in order to increase sales.294 The scheme lasted for a period
of two years and resulted in illicit profits totaling just under $3 million.295 As
part of the settlement, Orthofix admitted certain facts, acknowledged that its
conduct violated the federal securities laws, and paid over $6 million in
disgorgement, interest, and penalties.9 6 A few months earlier, the SEC settled
a much larger foreign bribery scheme with Och-Ziff Capital Management
Group. That scheme spanned a period of four years and involved payments
to high ranking government officials in multiple African countries including
Libya, Chad, Niger, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.97 To settle
the matter, Och-Ziff agreed to pay nearly $200 million in disgorgement,
interest, and penalties.29 Yet Och-Ziff was allowed to settle on a no-admit/nodeny basis.299
2.

Lack of Consistency Between Entities
and Individuals in the Same Case

The Grant Thornton case discussed above is not the only time an entity
has made admissions as part of a settlement while the SEC allowed the
individuals who actually committed the admitted acts to settle on a noadmit/no-deny basis.3oo For example, in November 2014, the SEC settled a
pending action against Wedbush Securities, a Los Angeles area broker-

292.
293.

294.

Id. at*5-6.
Id.at*l.

Orthofix Int'l, N.V., Exchange Act Release No. 79,828,

2017

WL 192393, at *1 (Jan.

18, 2017).

295.

Id.

296. Id. at *6.
297. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,989, 2016 WL
5461964, at "1 (Sept. 29, 2016).
298.
Id. at *35.
299.
Id. at *2.
300.
See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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dealer.3oI Wedbush settled the charges, which involved violations of market
access rules, by paying a penalty of $2.44 million, admitting specified facts,
and acknowledging that its conduct violated the federal securities laws.3"1 The
same day, the SEC settled with two Wedbush executives for causing the
violations at issue on a no-admit/no-deny basis.3os Similarly, in October 2o16,
Credit Suisse paid $90 million and admitted wrongdoing to settle charges that
it misrepresented certain key performance metrics.304 The same day, the SEC
settled charges against the executive who caused the violations at issue on a
no-admit/no-deny basis.305
More recently, in the Orthofix case discussed above, the SEC brought
charges against Orthofix for accounting violations as well as violations of the
FCPA.3o Orthofix settled the two matters at the same time by paying more
than $14 million in disgorgement and civil penalties.307 There were two
separate orders entered against Orthofix; in each order, Orthofix admitted
specified facts and acknowledged that its conduct violated the federal
securities laws.3 °8 At the same time, the SEC settled with four former Orthofix
executives allegedly responsible for the misconduct (or at least for the
accounting violations) at issue; the four executives settled on a no-admit/nodeny basis.3o9
The disparate treatment of entities and individuals in the same matter is
particularly jarring because entities act only by and through individuals.
Entities may be held responsible for the unlawful acts of the individuals in
their employ when those acts are done on behalf of the entity. In the situations
just described, there are entities (inanimate juridical creatures) admitting to
facts concerning the acts of certain individuals, while those same individualsthe ones who actually committed the acts in question-are refusing to admit
those facts. This is all the more disconcerting given that in the very same
release where she announced the new admissions policy, Chair White also
3o.
Press Release, SEC, Wedbush Securities and Two Officials Agree to Settle SEC Case:
L.A_-Based Broker-Dealer Admits Wrongdoing and Will Pay Financial Penalty for Market Access
Violations (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-263.
302.

See id.

303.

See id.
Press Release, SEC, Credit Suisse Paying $90 Million Penalty for Misrepresenting
Performance Metric (Oct. 5, 2o 16), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2o 16-21 o.html.
304.

305.

3o6.

See id.

See supranotes 294-97 and accompanying text.

See Press Release, SEC, Medical Device Company Charged with Accounting Failures and
FCPA Violations (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-18.html.
307.

3o8. Orthofix Int'l, N.V., Securities Act Release No. 10,281, Exchange Act Release No.
79,815, 201 7 WL 192377 (Jan. 18, 2017) (accounting case); Orthofix Int'l, N.V., Exchange Act
Release No. 79,828, 2017 WL 192393 (Jan. 18, 2017) (FCPA case).
309.
See Jeffrey Hammel, Securities Act Release No. 10,282, Exchange Act Release No.
79,817, 2017 WL 192378, at *1 (Jan. 18, 2017); McCollum, Exchange Act Release No. 79,819,
2017 WL 192389, at *1 (Jan. 18, 2017); Mack, Exchange Act Release No. 79,820, 2017 WL
19239o, at*1 (Jan. 18, 2017).
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stated that a "core principle of any strong enforcement program is to pursue
responsible individuals wherever possible."sl ° Chair White further noted that
"[c] ompanies, after all, act through their people. And when we can identify
those people, settling only with the company may not be sufficient. Redress
for wrongdoing must never be seen as 'a cost of doing business' made good
by cutting a corporate check."3s1 In light of these statements, it seems wholly
disingenuous to insist that admissions are required as a price of settlement for
an entity, but not for the individuals who actually committed the wrongdoing
in question. It also creates the inescapable impression that individuals are
being let off easy so long as the corporate check is big enough.
More to the point, many of the cases where entities have made admissions
as part of a settlement involved no individual charges at all, and this includes
some of the most egregious cases as measured by the sums involved and the
penalties assessed. For example, in August 2014, Bank of America agreed to
pay $245 million and made admissions in settling two cases involving
disclosures concerning mortgage loans during the financial crisis.3'! No

individuals were charged.3'3 In December 2015, the SEC brought an action
against two JPMorgan entities for failing to disclose conflicts of interest with
clients.3'4 JPMorgan settled the matter by paying $267 million in
disgorgement, interest and penalties, admitted certain facts and
acknowledged that its conduct violated the federal securities laws.315 No
individuals were charged.3' 6 In January 2016, the SEC brought a case against
Barclays, which Barclays settled by paying $70 million in disgorgement and
penalties and admitting wrongdoing.17 Again, no individuals were
charged.3' 8 In July 2016, the SEC settled a case with Citigroup, which paid a
$7 million penalty and admitted wrongdoing; no individuals were charged.319
In December 2016, the SEC settled a matter with Deutsche Bank, which was
accused of misleading clients about the performance of an automated order
router.o Deutsche Bank admitted wrongdoing and paid an $18. 5 million
penalty to the SEC and another $18. 5 million to the Attorney General of New

31o. White, supra note 3.
311.
Id. Chair White also stated: "I want to be sure we are looking first at the individual conduct
and working out to the entity, rather than starting with the entity as a whole and working in." Id.
312.
Press Release, Bank of America, supra note 222.
313.

See id.

315.

See id.

314.

See Press Release, J.P. Morgan, supra note

270.

316. See id.
317. See Press Release, Barclays, supra note 250.
318. See id.
319. See Press Release, SEC, SEC: Citigroup Provided Incomplete Blue Sheet Data for 15
Years (July 12, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2o16-138.html.
320.
See Press Release, SEC, Deutsche Bank Settles Charges of Misleading Clients About
Order Router (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2o 16-26 4 .html.
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York.32I No individuals were charged.322 Most recently, the SEC brought a
settled action against Morgan Stanley Smith Barney concerning a failure to
implement proper compliance procedures with respect, to certain risky
investments.33 Morgan Stanley paid an $8 million penalty, admitted certain
facts and acknowledged that its conduct violated the federal securities laws.324
No individuals were charged.325
The lack of individual charges, and the concomitant lack of individual
responsibility, was at the root of much of the critique that Judge Rakoff and
others leveled against the agency, which ultimately prompted the move

towards requiring admissions in certain cases.32 6 But despite the policy

change, beneath the surface it appears to be business as usual. Redress for
wrongdoing is still "'a cost of doing business' made good by cutting a
corporate check," albeit with corporate admissions of responsibility that may,
or may not, lead to further corporate liability that requires cutting another
corporate check. Individuals are still not being held to account, even in those
situations where, by the SEC's proffered standards for requiring admissions,
the conduct has put investors and the markets most at risk or is otherwise
2
egregious.3 7

It is also noteworthy that the cases described above all involved major
financial institutions: JPMorgan, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, and
Morgan Stanley. Indeed, to date only four of the admissions cases involving
large banks and other major financial institutions have involved charges
8

against individuals.32

321.

Id.

322.

See id.

323.

Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4649, 2017
WL 5 872 4 6, at *l (Feb. 14, 2017).
324. Id. at *7.
325. Id. at *2.
326. See supra Part II.B-C.
327. The two notable exceptions are the Falcone/Harbinger matter, and the G-Trade/
Convergex matter, both of which involved admissions by both entities and individuals, and both
of which included scienter-based fraud charges. Final ConsentJudgment Falcone, supra note 149,
at 2-3; Final ConsentJudgment Harbinger, supranote 15o ,at 2-3; G-Trade Servs. LLC, Exchange
Act Release No. 71,128, 107 SEC Docket 5418, 5419-20 (Dec. 18, 2013).
328. Credit Suisse AG, Securities Act Release No. 10,299, Exchange Act Release No. 79,044,
2014 WL 316743 (Oct. 5,2016); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 78,141, 2016 WL 4363431, at *3 (June 23, 2016); Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs.,
Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange Act Release No. 74,104, 1lo SEC Docket 3793, 3794
(Jan. 21, 2015);JPMorgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 70,458, 107 SEC Docket 877,
877 (Sept. 19, 2013). If the hedge fund Harbinger is added, the number jumps to five. In
addition, Wells Fargo made admissions in a case involving controls over non-public information,
in a case where an individual was charged with insider trading. See Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 73,175, 1o9 SEC Docket 4995, 4995 (Sept. 22, 2014). In contrast,
several major cases that involved both entities and individuals being charged, were settled on a
no-admit/no-deny basis. See, e.g.,
Weatherford Int'l, PLC, Securities Act Release No. 10,221,
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To the extent that any trend has emerged, it would appear that the SEC
is typically seeking admissions from big financial institutions in cases where
no individuals are being charged and where there is no realistic possibility of
collateral consequences in the form of criminal charges, private class actions
or regulatory infirmities.
3.

Other Lack of Consistency Within the Same Case

Even within the same case there are other curious inconsistencies. For
example, in January 2015, the SEC brought a major case against Standard
& Poor's Rating Services involving a series of securities law violations in
connection with the ratings of certain commercial mortgage-backed
securities.32 9 The case was important because it was one of the few significant
actions the SEC brought concerning misconduct related to the types of
products at the root of the financial crisis of 2008. Standard & Poor's paid a
$58 million penalty to settle the SEC charges, which included scienter-based
fraud (section 17 (a) (1) of the Securities Act), and an additional $19 million
to two State Attorneys General.33o As part of the settlement, the SEC entered
three separate orders on consent against Standard & Poor's. One of the
orders contained a limited admission of facts; the other two orders were
entered on a no-admit/no-deny basis.33,
Other discrepancies are also hard to explain. Take the example of
Spongetech Inc., a company that was involved in a fraudulent pump-anddump scheme. Two of Spongetech's attorneys, Joel Pensley and Jack
Halperin, were charged and accused of making false and misleading
statements in attorney opinion letters which stated that restrictive legends
could be removed from shares of Spongetech's common stock.332 At different
times during 2016, each of them settled the underlying action by consenting
to the entry of a judgment permanently enjoining them from violating the
registration and anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. In
connection with the entry of those orders, Pensley made admissions, while

Exchange Act Release No. 78,944, 2016 WL 539051 1 (Sept. 27, 2016); Monsanto Co., Securities
Act Release No. 10,037, Exchange Act Release No. 77,087, 2016 WL 537943 (Feb. 9, 2o16).
329. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Charges Against Standard & Poor's for
Fraudulent Ratings Misconduct (Jan. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Press Release, SEC Announces
Charges], https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2o1 5 -lo.html.

330. Id.
331. Compare Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs., 11o SEC Docket at 3793, with Standard
& Poor's Ratings Servs., Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange Act Release No. 74,102, 1 10
SEC Docket 3790, 3790 (Jan. 21, 2015), and Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs., Exchange Act
Release No. 74,103, 1 lo SEC Docket 3854, 3854 (Jan. 21, 2015).

See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Spongetech and Senior Executives in Pump-and332.
Dump Scheme (May 5, 201 o), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2o 10/201 o.7ohtm.
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Halperin was allowed to settle on a no-admit/no-deny basis.333 Both lawyers
subsequently consented to the entry of orders in follow-on administrative
proceedings barring them from appearing or practicing before the
Commission. In connection with the entry of those orders, Pensley again
acknowledged that his conduct violated the federal securities laws, while
Halperin did not.334

Inconsistencies in the treatment of similarly situated individuals is one
thing, but several of the admissions cases have involved inconsistent treatment
where the least culpable respondents made admissions, while the most
culpable ones did not. The case involving Kevin McKnight and Undiscovered
Equities, discussed above, is a good example. McKnight and his firm made
admissions in settling a case involving the failure to disclose the amount of
compensation they received as part of a public relations effort to increase

interest in Houston American Energy Corp.335 There were no fraud charges
and McKnight was fined a total of $22,500.336 Houston American and its

president John Terwilliger were charged with far more serious misconduct:
making multiple fraudulent statements concerning estimated oil and gas
reserves in an area that Houston American was going to exploit.337 As a result
of the misstatements, Houston American's stock price jumped from "$4 per
share to $2o per share" over approximately six months.338 When the wells

turned out to be dry, Houston American's share price dropped to 40 cents
per share, wiping out $6oo million in market capitalization.339 McKnight and
his firm made admissions as part of their settlements, while Houston
American and John Terwilliger were allowed to settle on the same day on a
no-admit/no-deny basis, even though their conduct was clearly more
egregious, as evidenced by the charges, which included scienter-based fraud,
and the amount of the penalties they were required to pay ($400,ooo and
$15o,ooo respectively).340

Even in cases where multiple parties have made admissions, there have
been troubling inconsistencies in the form of admission, with less culpable
defendants arguably receiving harsher treatment than more culpable ones. In
the Falcone/Harbinger matter, for example, PeterJenson, who was charged

333. Compare Consent of DefendantJoel Pensley, SEC v. Spongetech Delivery Sys., Inc., No.
1o-cv-2o31 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016), with FinalJudgment as to DefendantJack H. Halperin, SEC
v. Spongetech Delivery Sys., Inc., No. Io-cv-2o31 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2016).
334. CompareJoelPensley, Exchange Act Release No. 79,202, 2016 WL 6441267 (Oct. 31, 2016),
withJackH. Halperin, Exchange Act Release No. 77,972, 2o 6 WL 3072176 (June 1, 2o 6).
335. Hous. Am. Energy Corp., Securities Act Release No. 9757, 2015 WL 1843840, at *4
(Apr. 23, 2015).

336. Id. at *2.
337. Hous. Am. Energy Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 74,800, 2015 WL 1843838, at *2
(Apr. 23, 2015).
338. Id.
339. Id. at *3.
340. Id. at*15.
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with aiding and abetting Harbinger's violations, admitted not only to certain
facts, but also acknowledged that his conduct violated the federal securities

laws.34' Conversely, Philip Falcone, who was charged as a primary violator,

made only certain factual admissions without acknowledging that his conduct
violated the law.342
D.

LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

The lack of consistency in treatment of seemingly similar cases and the
lack of clear standards for when admissions will be required is compounded
by an almost complete lack of transparency in the process. The press releases
and the litigation and administrative releases frequently trumpet admissions,
but they never reveal why admissions were deemed necessary or desirable in
any particular case, or likewise why the agency did not obtain them in other
cases. There may well be good reasons why seemingly similar cases are treated
differently, but the SEC never reveals why, at least with respect to admissions.
A good example of this lack of transparency is the Standard & Poor's case
discussed above. In 2015, the SEC brought three settled administrative
proceedings against Standard & Poor's regarding misconduct in the rating of
certain mortgage-backed securities. The three actions were brought at the
same time and announced in the same press release;343 clearly, they could
have been brought as a single action.344 But only one of the three orders
involved admissions; the other two cases were settled on a no-admit/no-deny
basis.345 With respect to one of the three actions, it's possible to venture a
guess as to why admissions were not required: According to the SEC, Standard
& Poor's self-reported the particular misconduct at issue in that case and
cooperated with the investigation, enabling the agency to "resolve the case
more quickly and efficiently."34 6 The SEC specifically noted that cooperation

resulted in a "reduced penalty for the firm."347 Perhaps the SEC similarly

341.
See Final ConsentJudgment as to Defendant Peter A. Jenson, supra note 173, at 2.
342. Final Consent Judgment Falcone, supra note 149, at 13; see also Lowenfels & Sullivan,
supranote 166, at 8o3 (finding application of admissions criteria "puzzling" and referencing the
differential treatment betweenjenson and Falcone).
343. Press Release, SEC Announces Charges, supra note 329.
344. The SEC often brings cases involving distinct instances of misconduct as a single action.
It is unclear whether the SEC issued three orders with respect to Standard & Poor's because of a
legitimate need to separate things out (perhaps relating to the fact of admissions in one case and
not the others), or whether the SEC was simply padding its enforcement numbers.
345. See Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs., Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange Act
Release No. 74,102, 11o SEC Docket 3790, 3790 (Jan. 21, 2015) (resolving on a no-admit/nodeny basis); Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs., Exchange Act Release No. 74,103, 11 o SEC Docket
3854, 3854 (Jan. 21, 2015) (resolving on a no-admit/no-deny basis); Standard & Poor's Ratings
Servs., Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange Act Release No. 74,104, 11o SEC Docket 3793,
3793 (Jan. 21, 2015) (involving admissions).
346. Press Release, SEC Announces Charges, supra note 329.
347. Id.
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considered cooperation in deciding whether or not to require admissions; if
that were the case, it would be nice if the agency said so explicitly.
Trying to distinguish the other two Standard & Poor's orders is
considerably more difficult. Both matters were connected to the same line of
business (commercial mortgage-backed securities); both involved violations
of the same scienter-based statutory provision (section 17(a)(1)

of the

Securities Act); and both resulted in significant financial penalties
($35 million and $15 million respectively).34s Yet one matter settled with
admissions, the other on a no-admit/no-deny basis.49 Again, there may be
valid reasons for treating the cases differently, but the SEC should at least
explain its reasoning.
On a few occasions, then-Chair White and the then-Director of
Enforcement have tried to elucidate the goals that admissions in particular
cases have served, but the pronouncements have been few in number and are
typically bare bones declarations that are less than enlightening.35o In a speech
in May 2014, then-Director of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney tried to provide
some clarity by pointing to five matters where the SEC had obtained
admissions and giving a very brief explanation tying the admissions to the
stated framework. For example, he noted that in the ConvergEx matter "the
defendants were regulated entities and their egregious and fraudulent
conduct harmed numerous clients."351 Similarly, he stated that theJPMorgan
case pertaining to the so-called "London Whale" "created a significant risk to
investors.352 Admissions in the Philip Falcone/Harbinger matter "helped
give the public unambiguous information about the defendant's actions so
they would be empowered to make informed decisions about whether to
continue investing in companies with which he was involved."353 Scottrade had

348.
Standard& Poor'sRatings Servs., 1io SEC Docket at 3790; Standard&Poor's Ratings Servs.,
11 o SEC Docket at 3793.

349. Compare Standard & Poor's Ratings Servs., Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange
Act Release No. 9,704, 11o SEC Docket 3790 (Jan. 21, 2015), with Standard & Poor's Ratings
Servs., Securities Act Release No. 9705, Exchange Act Release No. 74,104, 11 o SEC Docket 3793,
3793 (Jan. 21, 2015).
350.
See, e.g., Maryjo White, Chair, SEC, Chairman's Address at SEC Speaks 2014 (Feb. 21, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2o14-spcho22114mjw (citing examples where the new admissions
policy was used, without explanation); Andrew Ceresney, SEC, Remarks at SIFMA's 2015 Anti-Money
Laundering & Financial Crimes Conference (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
022515-spchc.html (citing specific examples of requiring admissions in two anti-money-laundering
cases, Wedbush and Oppenheimer, as cases "where heightened accountability and acceptance of
responsibility are in the public interest" and noting the "magnitude of Oppenheimer's regulatory
failures"); Andrew Ceresney, SEC, The SEC's Cooperation Program: Reflections on Five Years of
Experience (May 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/sec-cooperation-program.html
(noting that the SEC had entered into a settlement with an individual defendant and "obtained
admissions from him as part of his settlement to provide clarity on what he would testify to at trial").
351. Ceresney, Compliance Week, supra note 12.
352.

Id.

353.

Id.
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"impeded the SEC's ability to investigate misconduct and protect investors"
and Lions Gate "sent an important message to the market about the perils of
misleading investors in the midst of a tender offer battle."s54 As meager as
these explanations are, they at least try to give the public some understanding
of why the SEC sought admissions in particular cases and what function they
served.
But Ceresney's speech is the only real attempt to situate admissions cases
and provide some explanation of why the SEC is proceeding the way it is.
Beyond that speech, there has been almost no attempt to explain, and
certainly no in-depth explanations of how the stated factors apply or, more
significantly, why they don't. There has been no explanation whatsoever as to
why the SEC is still allowing most cases to settle on a no-admit/no-deny basis,
even though the stated standards would seem to apply. The lack of
transparency leaves market participants, defense counsel, and the public in
the dark about when or why admissions will be required, or the purpose they
serve in particular cases. This deficiency seriously undermines any value that
admissions may have, particularly with respect to public perceptions of agency
fairness and effectiveness. When similar cases are treated differently without
any attempt at explanation, the process starts to appear arbitrary, or worse,
rigged-the exact opposite of what the admissions policy was ostensibly
designed to achieve.
The admissions policy was adopted in large part in reaction to judicial
criticism and public perception that the SEC was prone to entering into
sweetheart deals that essentially swept wrongdoing under the rug. One of the
stated purposes behind requiring admissions was the cathartic effect that
accompanies a public rendering of accountability. Chair White compared'the
process to an admission made in connection with a guilty plea: "[I] t creates
an unambiguous record of the conduct and demonstrates unequivocally the
defendant's responsibility for his or her acts."355 When Ms. White was the U.S.

Attorney for the Southern District of New York, she began using deferred
prosecution agreements-which did not require a guilty plea-and insisted
that "a public admission of wrongdoing was required for the resolution to
have sufficient teeth and public accountability."356 The SEC admissions policy
followed the same model.357 Then-Director of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney

made the same point about public accountability and responsibility, referring
to the "cathartic" quality of admissions.35s
354.
355.

356.
357.
358.

Id.

White, supra note 3.

Id.
Id.
See Ceresney, supra note 51 ("But there also is a group of cases where a public airing of

unambiguous facts-whether through admissions or a trial-serve such an important public

interest that we will demand admissions, and if the defendant is not prepared to admit the
conduct, litigate the case at trial. I analogize it to a guilty plea in a criminal case-there is a certain
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But public accountability depends, at least in part, on transparency.
Without some measure of explanation of why some cases, some persons, and
some entities are providing admissions while others-the vast majority-are
not, admissions lose much of their value. The lack of transparency with
respect to admissions is all the more glaring given that the SEC is now
increasingly using the administrative process to settle cases.359 While the SEC
used to settle most of its important enforcement matters in federal district
court proceedings, where the settlement is subject to review and approval by
a federal district judge, the agency is now settling most of its big cases inhouse, where the settlement need only be approved by the Commission.360
The move to administrative settlements was driven by the fact that federal
judges were beginning to scrutinize these settlements carefully, and on a few
notable occasions rejected settlements they thought were inadequate and
possibly collusive.36, Ironically, the judicial call for greater public
accountability led the SEC to further insulate the settlement process from
public review. The SEC's move to requiring admissions was also a response to
judicial criticism of the settlement process, but without a public reckoning of
why admissions are obtained in certain cases, the process seems murkier than
ever.
Finally, public accountability also depends, in some measure, on
publicity. While the SEC has certainly publicized some settlements that have
included admissions, it has buried others in the muck: They are difficult to
find, and often difficult to decipher. In one particularly egregious example,
in February 2016, the SEC entered into a settlement with Sidney M. Field in
connection with a Ponzi scheme that netted nearly $8 million in illicit
profits.36 2 This was a case "where a large number of investors ha[d] been
harmed" and where "the conduct was ... egregious."163 It was also a case

"where the conduct posed a significant risk to ...investors," and one "where
admissions would aid investors deciding whether to deal with a particular
party in the future."364 So clearly it met the test for requiring admissions, and
the consent judgment included an admission by Mr. Field of the facts in the
SEC complaint, as well as an admission that the conduct violated the law. But
outside of the proposed consent judgment and the actual order-which are

amount of accountability that comes from a defendant admitting to unambiguous, uncontested

facts. It is in many respects a cathartic moment. And there can be no denying the facts under

those circumstances.").
359. See, e.g., Ceresney, White Collar Institute, supra note 12.
36o. See Velikonja, supra note 93 ("Before Dodd-Frank, 40% of settlements were filed in

administrative proceedings; in fiscal year 2015, over 8o% were.").
361.
See, e.g.,
SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
201 1); SEC v. Bank of Am.Corp., 653 F. Supp.2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
362.
See Final Judgment as to Defendant Sidney M. Field, supra note 1o, at 8.
363.

364.

White, supra note 3.

Id.
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public documents available by accessing the Court docket-the SEC never
publicly disclosed the settlement or the admissions it contained: There was no
press release or litigation release (the latter of which is supposed to be issued
with respect to all major litigation developments). Indeed, as of this date,
there is absolutely no mention of Mr. Field's settlement anywhere on the SEC
website. If the goal is public accountability and helping investors decide whom
they want to do business with, it is hard to see how an admission buried deep
in a court filing could ever accomplish anything. The SEC nonetheless
included Mr. Field settlement in the numbers it released when it touted the
6
success of the new admissions policy.3 5

Similarly, in 2015 the SEC brought an action in federal district court in
California against Paul Mata and two cohorts for running a wide ranging real
estate investment scheme.366 In June 2016, the Commission settled its case
against Mr. Mata who consented to the entry of a judgment in which he
admitted certain facts..g67The case was certainly ripe for admissions: Investors
lost millions of dollars, and there was a need to warn the public about the

illicit nature of the investment scheme.368 But the consent judgment, which
contains the admissions, is not available on the SEC website, and the SEC did
not announce the entry of the judgment or the admissions in any way: There
is no press release or even a litigation release with respect to the entry of the
judgment.369 Again, to whatever extent it was important to obtain admissions
from Mr. Mata as a condition of settlement-and the conduct in that case did
appear to be egregious and resulted in large losses to investors-the value of
the admissions is entirely undermined by the fact that the SEC never set forth
365. The White Release states that the SEC obtained admissions from 29 individual
defendants (as of November 14, 2016). See Press Release, White Departure, supra note 13. To
arrive at that number, the Fields settlement had to be included. See infra Appendix.
366. See Complaint, SEC v. Paul Mata, No. 15 -CV-17 9 2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015).
367. Final Judgment as to Paul Mata, SEC v. Paul Mata, No. 15 -CV-17 92 (C.D. Cal. June 17,
2016); Consent to Entry of FinalJudgment by Paul Mata, SEC v. Paul Mata, No. 1 5-CV-1792 (C.D.
Cal. June 16, 2016).
368. See Consent to Entry of Final Judgment by Paul Mata, supra note 367.
369 . A few months later, Mr. Mata consented to the entry of an order in a follow-on
administrative proceeding barring him from association with a broker-dealer. Mata, Exchange
Act Release No. 78,736, 2016 WL 4537679, at *1 (Aug. 31, 2016). In that order, Mr. Mata neither
admitted nor denied the findings except for the findings in one paragraph, which did no more
than recite the entry of the judgment in the underlying matter. See id. There is no reference to
the admissions obtained in connection with that judgment. See id. The failure to publicize Mata's
admissions is all the more baffling given that this was another example of defendants within the
same case being treated differently: Mata's two co-defendants, Mario Pincheira and David Kayatta,
were both allowed to settle on a no-admit/no-deny basis. See SEC v. Paul Mata,
No. 1 5 -CV-17 9 2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015); Consent to Entry of Final Judgment by Mario
Pincheira, No. 15-CV-o17 9 2 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2016); Consent to Entry of FinalJudgment by
David Kayatta, No. 15 -CV-o17 9 2 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2016). Mata was clearly the ring-leader of
the scheme and obtained the bulk of the proceeds; that is the likeliest reason for the differential
treatment, but it is all the more reason to say so publicly. See Final Judgment as to Paul Mata, supra
note 367.
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the admissions in a way that the public would be on notice of them. Mr. Mata
was ordered to pay more than $11 million in disgorgement and a $4 million
penalty, and he admitted the facts of the illegal scheme,37o but you would
never know it from the SEC.
V.

CONCLUSION

When the SEC first announced its new policy on admissions, it was met
with considerable concern by the industry and defense bar. In particular,
there was concern that admissions in SEC settlements would have collateral
consequences for defendants and respondents-especially, increased
exposure to private class action law suits. As a result, many predicted that
defendants and respondents, particularly entities, would no longer be willing
to settle matters, preferring to take their chances in litigation. The
consequence would be more trials, which would consume precious agency
resources and impede productive investigatory work. In the end, the SEC's
enforcement program would be compromised, leaving investors and the
markets at risk.
Four years on, it is safe to say that the worst fears have failed to
materialize. The SEC continues to bring record numbers of enforcement
actions and most of these cases continue to settle without collateral
consequences. The reason for this result is simple, but it calls into question
the SEC's claims concerning the success of the admissions policy and whether
the policy is worth maintaining.
The sky has not fallen because the SEC has very rarely resorted to
requiring admissions as the price of settling cases. The overwhelming majority
of SEC settlements are still done on a no-admit/no-deny basis. Moreover,
when the SEC has obtained admissions in connection with settlements, the
charges have almost never involved scienter-based fraud, or violations of
securities law provisions that could give rise to private liability. This is no
doubt by design. Whether the SEC has acted judiciously, or whether
defendants and respondents have simply refused to settle where the
admissions could lead to collateral consequences, the result is the same. This
may be a concession to reality, but it hits at the heart of why admissions were
thought desirable in the first place.
One possibility is that the SEC is not requiring admissions in the most
egregious cases, contrary to the stated framework and goals of the policy. If
this is correct, it would imply that the requisite measure of public
accountability is actually greater in cases of less egregious conduct, which
makes very little sense on either practical or moral grounds.
Another possibility is that the conduct at issue was indeed egregious, but
the SEC was willing to negotiate the charge down in order to obtain an
37 o .
2o16).

Final Judgment as to Paul Mata, SEC v. Paul Mata, 15 -CV-1

792

(C.D. Cal. June 17,
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admission. If that is the case, whatever public accountability is obtained by
virtue of an admission that the conduct violated the law is immediately
undermined by a charge that reflects negligent, rather than intentional or
even reckless, conduct; such a settlement says "yes, we admit that we violated
the law, but clearly the conduct was not that bad." If an admission signals
"egregiousness," a weak charge simultaneously signals a lack of
"egregiousness." At best, they cancel one another Out.37'
The tension between egregiousness and lower charges also feeds
cynicism that the SEC is willing to negotiate the other way as well: seeking
higher penalties, and perhaps insisting on higher charges, as a condition for
settling a case without factual admissions or an admission of liability.372 There
is some belief among the defense bar-though no actual evidence-that this
is in fact occurring.373 If that were true, it would suggest that the admissions
policy is being used as a cudgel to extort high monetary settlements from less
culpable defendants who feel they have no choice. Whether or not it is true,
perceptions often matter most. Indeed, it was in part the perception that the
SEC was acting collusively with defendants in settling matters that led the
agency to adopt the admissions policy, with its focus on openness and public
accountability.
Unfortunately, on that score the SEC has utterly failed to effectuate the
goal of public accountability. There has been a complete lack of consistency
and transparency in the use of the admissions policy, and this too feeds
considerable cynicism. When similar cases are treated differently without any
explanation, the process begins to look arbitrary. Today, the SEC continues
to settle the vast majority of its cases on a no-admit/no-deny basis, including
cases that, by virtue of the charges and monetary sanctions involved, clearly
amount to egregious conduct or conduct that puts investors or the markets at
risk. The few cases in which admissions have been obtained cannot readily be
distinguished from others that look very similar but settled without
admissions. There may well be good reasons why admissions were felt

371.

Carmen Germaine, SEC Lobs Another Soft Admission with Credit Suisse Deal, LAW 3 6o

(Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.law36o.com/articles/8 49o64 /sec-lobs-another-soft-admission-

with-credit-suisse-deal.
372.
See, eg.,
BradleyJ. Bondi, An Evaluation of the SEC'sAdmissions Policy, CMR. FOR FIN. STABILITY
(July 7, 2016), http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/research/Bondi-0707i 6.pdf.
373. Matthew Garza, Piwowar Says Focus on "Broken Windows" Could Harm Markets, WOLTERS
KLUWER: SEC. REG. DAILY (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/securities/news/

piwowarsays-focusonbrokenwindowscouldharmmarkets (noting that SEC Enforcement
Director "bristled" when former SEC Enforcement Director, now a defense lawyer, "said the admissions
policy was being used as leverage in negotiations"); Lou R_ Mejia, The State of the SEC'sAdmissions Policy:
Three Years Later, PERKINSCOIE (Nov. lo, 2016), https://www.assetmanagementadvocate.com/2016/

11 /the-state-of-the-secs-admissions-policy-three-years-later ("While some commentators have suggested
that the SEC uses the threat of admissions to extract higher penalties, we are unaware of any specific
case where that has occurred. At a recent SEC conference, SEC Associate Director Gerald Hodgkins
firmly denied that the SEC engages in such a practice.").
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necessary in one case and not another, but the public cannot tell because the
SEC provides no explanation as to why it proceeded one way or another.
The lack of consistency between similarly situated persons and entities is
particularly troubling. That like cases should be treated alike is a fundamental
legal principle. To be sure, there is an element of discretion that is inherent
in the prosecutorial function, particularly at the settlement stage: All cases are
a little different, and the agency must weigh the litigation risks against the
certainty of settlement in situations involving multiple variables, ranging from
the quality of the evidence and the reliability of witnesses to the location of a
possible trial and everything in between. A certain amount of discretion in
fashioning the terms of settlement is imperative.374 Moreover, settlements are
extremely important to an agency like the SEC, which is highly constrained
by limited resources: Settlements allow the agency to obtain relief that is
within the range of what it could obtain at trial, without the risk and without
the expenditure of scarce resources that are better deployed elsewhere.35 But
while discretion in the settlement process is both necessary and beneficial,
there are dangers when discretion veers towards the arbitrary. The SEC has
obtained admissions in very few cases, without any perceivable consistency,
and without any explanation. If the goal of admissions is public accountability
and the "cathartic" effect that comes from a public reckoning of responsibility
for misconduct, the goal cannot be achieved unless the public is properly put
on notice of what is at stake and why.376 The lack of consistency and the lack

of transparency wholly undermine whatever value may be had by obtaining
admissions. Worse, these failures breed cynicism that undercuts, rather than
enhances, public trust in the process.
So what should be the future of the admissions policy? In answering this
question, it is important to recognize that admissions can indeed have a very
salutary effect: They can bring a measure of public accountability and
responsibility that is wholly lacking when a defendant can settle a matter on a
no-admit/no-deny basis. But admissions can only have that effect if they are
used more frequently, more consistently, more openly, and with respect to
the worst forms of misconduct.

374.
Even critics of the agency recognize that discretion is important. See, e.g., Testimony of
William F. Galvin, Sec'y of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Examining Settlement Practices

of US. Financial Regulators Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 7 (2012)
("As an executive agency, in the absence of obvious error, the SEC must be able to decide which
matters to investigate, which cases to litigate, which charges to bring, and the terms of any
settlements.").
375. See, e.g., White, supra note 3.
376. There are, of course, other reasons besides public accountability for requiring
admissions, such as locking-in a witness who may be required to testify at a future trial. See, e.g.,
Ceresney, White Collar Institute, supra note 12 (discussing the importance of obtaining
admissions in order to lock in a witness in the Wyly case).
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One approach then, would be to do away with no-admit/no-deny and
require admissions in every case.377 But this is simply unrealistic. That
approach would lead to the results most feared at the time the admissions
policy was adopted: a huge increase in litigation. The SEC, at least as currently
constituted, is not equipped for that task. And it would serve little purpose.
Settlements are important and they work; and settlements are all about
compromise and discretion.378 A blanket policy requiring admissions in all
cases would be counter-productive.
However, if the SEC is going to continue requiring admissions only in
certain cases, it has a duty to more explicitly lay out the framework of the
policy and the criteria it will apply. The SEC needs to be more consistent and
transparent, and to make clear in each instance why admissions were, or were
not, required, particularly if there is disparate treatment of persons and/or
entities accused of the same misconduct. Public accountability can only be
served if there is some measure of publicity in the process.
One possibility would be for the SEC to adopt a clear set of rules,
specifying when admissions will be required. But bright-line rules have their
own costs, and they too can be counter-productive. For example, a rule
requiring admissions in the most egregious cases-those involving scienterbased fraud-could lead the agency to back away from bringing those
charges. If defendants balk at making admissions, the SEC might prefer a
weaker settlement rather than the uncertainties and costs of litigation.
At the other extreme, the SEC could go back to its old policy of settling
cases on a no-admit/no-deny basis, save perhaps in cases where the defendant
or respondent has previously made an admission in another proceeding
concerning the same underlying activity. This would not actually be much of
a change, given that admissions are the rare exception, and most cases still
settle on a no-admit/no-deny basis. Moreover, from a public accountability
standpoint, a no-admit/no-deny settlement involving serious charges is often
preferable to obtaining an admission to less egregious conduct. Going back
to no-admit/no-deny would also have the virtue of eliminating inconsistent
applications of the admissions policy, along with all of concerns over
arbitrariness, power, and pressure that accompany a policy of uncertain
application.

377.

See, e.g., Priyah Kaul, Admit or Deny: A Callfor Reform of the SEC's "Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny"

378.

See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 752 F.3 d 285, 295-96 (2d Cir. 2014).

Policy, 48 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 535, 558-64 (2015).
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Appendix
Admissions in SEC Enforcement Cases
From Inception Through February 15, 2017
Case Name
(Federal Court
Actions &
Administaive
Proceedings)

individual
Defendant(s)
and
Administrative
Respondent(s)

Entity Defendant(s) and
Respondent(s)

wsEntered

Philip Falcone
SEC v. Falcone,
et al.,

Harbinger Capital
Partners Offshore

(S.D.N.Y)

Harbinger Capital
Partners Special
Situations GP, L.L.C

SECv.
Harbinger
Capital Partners
LLC et al.,

Harbinger Capital
Partners LLC

Manager, L.L.C.

12-cv-5027

12-cv-5028

(S.D.N.Y)

Philip Falcone

JPMorgan Chase & Co.

EA Rel. 70,458

G-Trade Services
LLC, et al.,
EA Rel. 71,128

Sept. 16,

2013

Sept. 16,

2013

Sept. 16,

2013

Sept. 16,

2013

Sept. 6,

2013

Oct. 1, 2014

PeterJenson

JPMorgan
Chase & Co.,

Date Consent
Judgment or
Order
Containing
Admissions

Sept.

19, 2013

G-Trade Services LLC

Dec. 18,

2013

Convergex Global
Markets Limited
Convergex Execution

Dec. 18,

2013

Dec. 18,

20l

3

Solutions LLC

Jonathan

Samuel Daspin,
EA Rel. 71,126

Thomas

Lekargeren,

EA Rel.

Jonathan
Daspin

Dec. i8, 2013

Lekargeren

71,127

SEC v. Craig S.
Lax,
15-cv-01079

(DNJ)

Craig S. Lax

Mar. 11, 20

5
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Scottrade, Inc.,

Scottrade Inc.

Jan. 29, 2014

Credit Suisse
Group AG,

Credit Suisse Group AG

Feb. 21, 2014

EA Rel. 71,435

EA Rel. 71,593

Lions Gate

Entertainment
Corp.,
EA Rel. 71,717

SEC v. Samuel E
Wyly, et al.,
10-cv-576o
(S.D.N.Y.)
SEC v. Heinz,
et al.,

13-cv-0753
(D. Utah)

Michael A.
Horowitz, et al.,
SA Rel. 9620
Bank of America
Corp.,
EA Rel. 72,888
Wells Fargo

Advisors, LLC,
EA Rel. 73,175

Wedbush
Securities Inc.,
et al.,
EA Rel. 73,652

Lions Gate
Entertainment Corp.

Michael C.
French

Mar.

Steven B.

Heinz

21, 2014

Apr. 28, 2014

Michael A.
Horowitz

July 31,

Bank of America Corp.
Wells Fargo Advisors,
LLC

Aug.

2014

21, 2014

Sept. 22, 2As

4

Wedbush Securities Inc.

Nov.

20, 2014

HSBC Private
Bank (Suisse),
SA,
EA Rel. 73,681

HSBC Private Bank
(Suisse), SA

Nov.

25, 2014

F-Squared
Investments,
Inc.,
AA Rel. 3988

F-Squared Investments,
Inc.

Dec.

22, 2014

Standard &
Poor's Ratings
Services,
SA Rel. 9705

Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services

Jan.21,2015

2017]
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Oppenheimer &

Oppenheimer & Co.

Co., Inc.,

Inc.

SA Rel. 9711

Deloitte Touche

Tohmatsu CPA Ltd.
BDO China

ErnstMing
&Young
LLP Hua

Dahua
Co.,
Ltd., CPA
et al.,
EA Rel. 74,217

KPMG Huazhen

Feb. 6,

2015

(Special General
Partnership)

Feb. 6,

2015

PricewaterhouseCoopers
Zhong Tian CPAs Ltd.

Feb. 6,

2015

Mg LLP

SECv. CKB168

Rayla Melchor

July 10, 2015

13-cv-5584

(E.D.N.Y.)

Chih Hsuan
"Kiki" Lin

July 10, 2015

Sean C. Cooper,
AA Rel. 4o63

Sean C.
Cooper

SEC v. Fusamae,
15-cv-3142

Katsuichi
Fusamae

Holdings Ltd,
et al.,

(N.D. Ill.)

Houston Am.
Energy Corp,
et al.,
SA Rel. 9757

SEC v. Grant,
et al.,
11-cv-11538
(D. Mass)

Santos

Kevin T.
McKnight

Benjamin Lee
Grant

15-cv-0438
(N.D. Tex.)

Sage Advisory Group,
LLC

Aquaphex Total Water
Solutions

Gregory G.
Jones

23, 2015

May

2015

27, 2015

May27,

Merrill Lynch
Professional Clearing
Corp.

SEC v.
Aquaphex Total

Apr.

Apr. 23,

Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc.

& Smith Inc.,
et al.,
EA Rel. 75,083

16, 2015

Apr. i6, 2015
Undiscovered Equities,
Inc.

Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner

Water Res.,
et al.,

Apr.

2015

June

1, 201 5

June

1, 2015

June

25, 215

June

25, 2015

IOWA LAWREVIEW

Oz
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July 14, 2015

Management,

OZ Management, LP

ITG Inc., et al.,
SA Rel. 9887

ITG Inc.
Alternet Securities, Inc.

BDO USA, LLP,
EA Rel., 75,862

BDO USA, LLP

Sept. 9,

Credit Suisse Securities
(USA) LLC

Sept. 28,

LP,
EA Rel. 75,445

Credit Suisse
Securities (USA)
LLC,
EA Rel. 75,992

Marwood Group

Marwood Group
Research, LLC,
EA Rel. 86, 5 12
SEC v. Watson,
15-cv-13868

(D. Mass.)

Research, LLC
Steven C.

Grant Thornton, LLP
JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.AJ.P. Morgan Securities

JPMorgan Chase
Bank N.A., et al.,
SA Rel. 9992

Barclays Capital Inc.

Inc.,
SA Rel. 1O,0o
Capital

Sidney M.

Steve Pappas,

Steve Pappas

Holdings, Inc.,
o9-cv-8 18
(C.D. Cal.)
EA Rel. 75,525

Reid S.Johnson,
EA Rel. 77,625

2015

2015

Nov. 24, 2015

Dec.

2, 2015

Dec. 18,

2015

Dec. i8, 2015

LLC

Barclays Capital

SEC v. Medical

12, 2015
12, 2015

Nov. 18, 201 5

Stsn

Grant
Thornton, LLP,
EA Rel. 76,536

Aug.
Aug.

Field

Reid S.

Johnson

Jan. 31, 2o16

Feb.

23, 2016

Apr. 5,
Apr.

_ Apr.

2016

14, 2016

4,__o_6
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2017]

Simonia de
Cassia Silva

May 27, 2016

Vinicius

Sept. 7, 2016

Romulo Aguiar
SEC v.

Tropikgadget
FZE, et al.,
15-cv-1 0543

(D. Mass.)

Sept. 7,

Thais Utino

Aguiar

Geovani
Nascimento
Bento

Sept. 16, 2016

Priscilla Bento

Sept. 16, 2o16

Dennis Arthur

Sept.

16, 2016

Elaine Amaral
Somaio

Sept.

16, 2016

Somaio

StevenJ.
Muehler, et al.,
EA Rel. 78,118

StevenJ.
Muehler

June 21, 2016
Alternative Securities
Markets Group Corp.

June

Blue Coast Securities
Corp.

The Bank of
New York
Mellon,

IC Rel.

2016

21,

2016

June 21, 2016

The Bank of New York
Mellon

June

13, 2016

32,151

Ethiopian
Electric Power,
SA Rel. 10,093
SEC v. Paul
Mata, et al.,

Ethiopian Electric
Power

June 8, 2016

Paul Mata

June 17, 2016

15-cv-1792
(C.D. Cal.)

Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner
& Smith Inc.,
et al.,
EA Rel. 78,1 4 1
Citigroup
Global Markets,
Inc.,
EA Rel. 78,291

Merrill Lynch, Pierce
Fenner & Smith Inc.

June 23, 2016

Merrill Lynch
Professional Clearing
Corp.

June 23, 2016

Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc

July 12, 2o16
1
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SEC v.

Spongetech
Delivery

Systems, Inc.,
10-CV-20 3

Aug.

Joel Pensley

4, 2016

1

(E.D.N.Y.)

Credit Suisse AG,
SA Rel. 10,229
Bank Leumi
le-Israel B.M.,
et al.,
EA Rel. 79,113

Credit Suisse AG

Oct. 5,

20 16

Bank Leumi le-Israel
B.M
Leumi Private Bank

Oct. 8,

2016

Bank Leumi
(Luxembourg) S.A.

State Street Bank
and Trust Co.,

State Street Bank and
Trust Co.

Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.,
SA Rel. 10,272

Deutsche Bank
Securities, Inc.

IA Rel. 32,390

John W. Rafal,
J
ReI.7 ,
EA Rel. 79,755

Oct. 18, 2016

John W. Rafal

Dec.

12,

2016

Dec. 16,2o16
Jan. 9,

2017

Allergan, Inc.,

Allergan, Inc.

Orthofix
International,
N.V,
SA Rel. 10,281

Orthofix International,
N.V.

Jan.8,2017

Orthofix
International,
N.V,
EA Rel. 79,828

Orthofix International,
N.V.

Jan. i8, 2017

Morgan Stanley Smith

Feb.14,2017

EA Rel. 79,814

Morgan Stanley
Smith Barney,

LLC,

IA Rel. 4649

Barney, LLC

Jan.17,2o
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